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ABSTRACT

In response to increasing demands on firm performance, organizations have
attempted to become more consumer and market responsive by adopting industry
conventions, such as appointing a chief marketing officer (CMO) to the top management
team (TMT). However, scholarly research on the presence or absence of a CMO, and the
relationship between the presence of a CMO on the TMT and firm performance is
nascent and conflicting. Thus, the purpose of these studies was to address these issues.
First, using institutional theory I empirically examined the conditions of firm visibility,
firm market power, and industry orientation to predict CMO presence / absence on a
firm’s TMT. Second, using signaling theory I examined the same conditions under which
CMO presence / absence leads to enhanced firm performance. Empirical testing was
performed on a sample of U.S. based public firms over a two year period. Firm visibility
and market power were found to help predict and explain the presence of a CMO on the
TMT. While no direct effect of CMO presence on firm performance was observed,
empirical support was found that suggests moderating relationships exist between CMO
presence and firm performance, for example, the moderating influence of CMO presence
on the relationship between firm visibility and firm performance. These findings add to
and expand on limited knowledge about CMO presence on the TMT. In addition, prior
CMO research utilized two definitions of a CMO – a “titled” CMO and someone with
“marketing” in their title. By comparing both definitions in my analysis, the outcome of
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each study suggests important differences exist between the two. Understanding these
differences could further aid firms in decisions about TMT structure.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

In response to increasing demands on firm performance, organizations have
attempted to become more consumer and market responsive by adopting industry
conventions such as appointing a chief marketing officer (CMO) to the top management
team (TMT) (McGovern, Court, Quelch, & Crawford, 2004). However, despite the
frequent addition of CMOs to the C-level suite, two troublesome observations regarding
CMOs remain. First, why do only 23% of Fortune 1000 companies have a CMO in place
(Spencer Stuart, 2013). Second, scholarly research on (1) the presence or absence of a
CMO and (2) the relationship between the presence of a CMO on the TMT and firm
performance is nascent.
Thus, the purpose of this dissertation is to address these concerns. First, I
theoretically and empirically examine the environmental conditions under which a CMO
is present on a firm’s TMT. Second, I theoretically and empirically examine the
conditions under which CMO presence leads to enhanced firm performance. More
specifically, I examine two primary questions: (1) What factors influence a CMO’s
presence on a firm’s TMT? and (2) Under what conditions does CMO presence moderate
the impact of firm performance? In doing so, my examination seeks to help explain why
some firms may have a CMO on the TMT and why prior research has reported
conflicting results regarding a CMO’s impact on firm performance.
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The primary theory employed for Essay 1 is institutional theory. Though limited
in its appearance in conventional marketing literature, this theory is instrumental in
shaping the rationale and hypothesis for firm structure, behavior, and performance with
regard to the presence of a CMO on the TMT (Cyert & March, 1963; DiMaggio &
Powell, 1983). Institutional theory provides a solid framework on which to build and
recognize the power of isomorphism to shape organizational behavior in an effort by the
organization to gain legitimacy and, ultimately, drive firm performance (DiMaggio &
Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). This theory recognizes that organizations conform
to the rules and belief systems prevailing in the external environment (DiMaggio &
Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977) and, as such, provides explanatory power for the
forces and rationale behind the presence of a CMO on a TMT. Institutional theory is also
particularly helpful when making comparisons between firms because external factors,
such as industry characteristics and industry orientation, are central to the reasons
differences in the TMT structure may exist.
The theory employed for Essay 2 is signaling theory. Signaling theory describes
the process decision makers use to resolve information asymmetry in competitive
environments (Spence, 1973). Signaling theory recognizes that individuals as well as
firms send signals to reduce information asymmetry because signals convey information
to outsiders and influence their perceptions (Clarkson, 1995; Connelly, Certo, Ireland, &
Reutzel, 2011; Freeman, 1984; Jones & Murrell, 2001). Thus, my two essay dissertation
seeks to build on the limited body of TMT research that examines the value of a CMO by
offering empirical data to help identify conditions under which a CMO is present on the
TMT and conditions under which a CMO impacts firm performance.

CHAPTER 2

PREDICTING THE PRESENCE OF CHIEF MARKETING OFFICERS (CMOs)
ON TOP MANAGEMENT TEAMS

ABSTRACT
Institutional theory proposes that it is in an organization’s best interest to conform
to the rules and belief systems prevailing in the external environment (DiMaggio &
Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Institutional theory applies these rules and belief
systems to the composition of top management teams (TMTs) (DiMaggio & Powell,
1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Williamson & Cable, 2003). However, not all TMTs are
the same in terms of a firm’s functional or managerial structure. This is especially true
when examining the presence or absence of a chief marketing officer (CMO) on the
TMT. The presence of a CMO on the TMT may be beneficial to the firm because the
appointment of a CMO has been viewed as (1) an indicator of the corporate status of
marketing at the firm level, (2) signifying corporate adoption of the marketing concept,
and (3) a proxy for the market power of the firm (Hise, 1965; Kerin, 2005; Mann, 1971;
Nath & Mahajan, 2008; Piercy, 1986; Webster, Malter, & Ganesan, 2003).
This study theoretically and empirically demonstrates the environmental
conditions under which a CMO is most likely to be present on a firm’s TMT.
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More specifically, I hypothesize and empirically examine key factors that serve as
antecedents to the presence of a CMO on the TMT in an attempt to explain why some
TMTs have a CMO presence while others do not. Prior research has shown that firms’
structural choices of the TMT are largely functional in nature and even utilitarian in
purpose. For example, Hambrick and Cannella (2004) found that TMT composition
draws a distinction between strategy formulation and implementation. More specifically,
Zorn (2004) found an increased prevalence of Chief Financial Officers on TMTs when
firms were faced with financial reporting complexity. However, structural choices within
the TMT can provide other highly desirable benefits. For example, structural choices in
the TMT have been shown to favorably influence investors’ perceptions of future firm
performance to the extent that they garner prestige and influence organizational
legitimacy (Certo & Hodge, 2007). Thus, the structure of the TMT is a way of presenting
attributes of the firm that are legitimizing (Zott & Huy, 2007). However, scholarly
marketing research that explains the presence or absence of a CMO on the TMT is scarce
and has yet to address Moorman and Rust’s (1999) call to examine the reasons and
rationale for the presence of senior management with specialization in marketing on the
TMT.
The CMO position embodies the highest position of leadership within the
marketing function of a corporation and, as such, has direct responsibility for providing
strategic leadership in the marketing activities of a firm (Boyd, Chandy, & Cunha, 2010).
The informational, decisional, and relational roles of the CMO help firms increase their
competitive capabilities in ways that can lead to enhanced firm value (Boyd et al., 2010),
while reducing complexity and uncertainty in the TMT (Court, 2007; Nath & Mahajan,

5

2008). In addition, the CMO is often considered the “voice of the consumer” on the TMT
(Court, 2007). For example, Kashmiri and Mahajan (2010) suggest that family-named
firms are more likely to have a CMO on the TMT where the voice of the consumer is
greater because family-named firms place a greater emphasis on maintaining a favorable
image of the firm and a positive perception of the corporate brand among consumers.
Nath and Mahajan (2008) empirically identify several internal organizational
factors or central tendencies (e.g., firm innovativeness) that predict CMO presence on the
TMT. However, as with most extant research on the management structure of the TMT
(Pettigrew, 1992), their work does not address the environmental context of the firm,
which may influence whether or not a TMT has a CMO. The purpose of this research is
to advance the scholarly literature by theoretically predicting and empirically examining
the environmental conditions under which a CMO is most likely to be present on a TMT.
Previous research on CMO presence has largely focused on the internal dynamics of the
firm. In contrast, I examined environmental antecedents of CMO presence on the TMT
for 572 publicly traded U.S. firms from 2010 and 2011 using the theoretical prism of
institutional theory.

Literature Review and Research Hypotheses

Institutional Theory
Institutional theory recognizes that organizations conform to the rules, structures,
practices, and belief systems prevailing in the external environment and within social
networks (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Organizations do so
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because they believe that institutional isomorphism earns them legitimacy (Dacin, 1997;
Deephouse, 1996; Suchman, 1995). Suchman (1995, p. 574) defines legitimacy as a
“perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or
appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and
definitions.” Kostova and Zaheer (1999) further define organizational legitimacy as the
acceptance of an organization by its external environment, such as when an organization
is deemed proper and appropriate (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Meyer & Scott, 1983).
Prior research (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Roberts & Greenwood, 1997) has
conceptualized two forms of organizational legitimization—cognitive and
sociopolitical—but they are not necessarily mutually exclusive (Ensley & Hmieleski,
2005). Cognitive legitimization refers to the level of public knowledge about the firm,
while sociopolitical legitimization is the extent to which key stakeholders and governing
bodies accept a firm as appropriate with respect to existing norms and laws (Ensley &
Hmieleski, 2005).
Researchers have linked the importance of organizational legitimacy to firm
growth and survival (e.g., Meyer & Rowan, 1977); when enhanced, organizational
legitimacy reduces uncertainty about institutional environments (Selznick, 1957), both
informationally and symbolically (Finkelstein, 1992). Institutional theory is particularly
applicable to investigating TMTs because their prestige influences organizational
legitimacy (Certo & Hodge, 1997; D’Aveni, 1991) and even the potential of the firm, as
viewed by external markets (Bharadwaj, Bharadwaj, & Konsynski, 1999; Spence, 1973).
In seeking legitimacy, firms often look to other firms they perceive as successful and
imitate their strategies as a way to achieve legitimacy (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).
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Firms imitate competitive strategies in a process DiMaggio and Powell (1983)
call “mimetic isomorphism.” Mimetic isomorphism is both a process and a state in which
firms seek and achieve conformity. Firms achieve this through imitation of structures,
practices, and belief systems that prevail in the external environment and within social
networks, which are considered sources of legitimacy (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983;
Haveman, 1993; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Mimetic isomorphism is most prevalent when
organizations are faced with ambiguity or environmental uncertainty (Cyert & March,
1963; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Mizruchi & Fein, 1999; Williamson & Cable, 2003).
Firms undertake mimetic isomorphism because it can be an advantageous and an
economical path to a viable problem solution (Cyert & March, 1963; DiMaggio &
Powell, 1983). Institutional theory and mimetic isomorphism help explain why firm
managers look to industry norms, firm traditions, and management trends, among other
things, to formulate organizational structures and policies (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983;
Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Zucker, 1987). Such policies may include the TMT structure and
the presence or absence of a CMO on the TMT.

Role of the CMO in the TMT
The sheer volume of scholarly examination over the past 50 years is evidence of
the importance that both academics and practitioners ascribe to the functionality of the
TMT. The definition of a TMT in most extant research is directionally based on Cyert
and March’s (1963) theoretical construct “dominant coalition,” which recognizes that
executives set firm direction and influence organizational performance through the
decisions they make (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). As previously noted, structural choices
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in the TMT are largely functional, but they can provide organizational legitimacy (Certo
& Hodge, 2007; D’Aveni, 1991; D’Aveni & Kesner, 1993) through structural
isomorphism (Dacin, 1997; Deephouse, 1996; Suchman, 1995).
Top managers with functional expertise are viewed as experts in that area and are
deemed in the best position to deal with environmental dependencies and critical
contingencies (Finkelstein, 1992). When managerial structures include a CMO on the
TMT, the CMO is viewed as providing (1) strategic leadership for the marketing
activities performed by the firm (Boyd et al., 2010) and (2) assistance to the TMT when
faced with market complexity (Court, 2007; Nath & Mahajan, 2008). The leadership
ability and character of the top marketing executive are also empirically associated with
the overall success of the marketing function of the firm (Vafeas & Vlittis, 2009).
The title “chief marketing officer” was first bestowed in the 1950s, but its
widespread use is a reasonably recent occurrence (Koleszar, 2009). Hopkins and Bailey
(1984) were among the first scholars to identify and empirically verify antecedents of the
presence of marketing leadership on the TMT in their analysis of 294 large companies.
Their measure was the presence or absence of a chief marketing executive (CME) on the
TMT. This person often held the title of “vice president of marketing” or “director of
marketing” and reported directly to the chairman, president, or chief executive officer
(CEO) 68% of the time (Hopkins & Bailey, 1984). Hopkins and Bailey further reported
that a CME presence stemmed from the homogeneity of business units or markets due to
the need for differentiation while the heterogeneity of business units or markets resulted
in CME absence.
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More recently, Nath and Mahajan (2008) empirically identified six internal
organizational factors that influence the adoption of TMT structures that included a
CMO. They found that innovativeness, differentiation, branding strategy, diversification,
functional experience of the TMT, and whether the CEO is an outsider each contributed
to the presence of a CMO on the TMT. When disparate organizations in the same line of
business are structured into an actual operational field, powerful forces emerge that lead
them to become even more similar to one another (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). The force
of structural isomorphism, according to DiMaggio and Powell (1983), also extends to
personnel flows and paths within an organizational field. The existence of common
career titles is but one example of structural isomorphism that DiMaggio and Powell cite.
Therefore, I propose that structural isomorphism (Dacin, 1997; Deephouse, 1996;
Suchman, 1995) is a significant determinant of the adoption of managerial structures that
include a CMO on the TMT when firms want to obtain, maintain, or increase firm
legitimacy. This perspective is directly supported by institutional theory and indirectly by
the findings of Williamson and Cable (2003), who demonstrate that TMT mimetic
isomorphism shapes TMT hiring patterns. By leveraging the explanatory power of
institutional theory, I am able to examine and predict how the theoretical constructs of
firm visibility, market power, and industry orientation (i.e., differentiation) directly affect
the likelihood of CMO presence on the TMT. The model in Figure 1 shows the
relationships to be tested.
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Figure 1
Model of Direct Relationships

Firm Visibility

Firm Market
Power

CMO Presence

Firm Industry
Orientation

Firm Visibility and CMO Presence in the Firm
Visibility is important to firms for several financial reasons, including that it helps
reduce the risk associated with uncertainty (Barry & Brown, 1986), reduces the cost of
capital (Merton, 1987), and helps attract a wider following by investors and information
intermediaries (Bushee & Miller, 2012). Baker, Powell, and Weaver (1999) suggest that
firm visibility can be defined as the degree to which analysts follow, and institutions
hold, a firm’s stock. A firm that is followed by many professional financial analysts is
likely to be highly visible to investors (Ackert & Athanassakos, 2001).
In addition to providing information and investment recommendations to
investors (Zuckerman, 1999), analysts strive to enhance their perceived value in the
marketplace by identifying mispriced securities (O'Brien & Bhushan, 1990). As a result,
there is growing realization among analysts that intangible assets such as brand equity,
technology applications, customer loyalty, and customer satisfaction are important
determinants of firm value (Barth, Clement, Foster, & Kasznik, 1998). However, this
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type of information is not typically captured or reported in formal financial disclosure
statements. As such, the analyst must seek out other reliable sources to aid in more
accurate firm valuation.
Prior research has also shown that analysts influence managers’ and firms’
behaviors and strategies (Rao & Sivakumar, 1999; Zuckerman, 1999). Analysts’
recommendations can affect firms’ strategies and actions indirectly through their
influences on investors’ behaviors and resulting stock prices and more directly by
exerting pressure on managers through interactions during earnings conference calls and
meetings (Benner, 2010). Therefore, because TMTs constitute the boundary between an
organization and its environment (Keck & Tushman, 1993), a key managerial task is to
select organizational structures and strategies that strike a balance between competitive
and institutional demands (Chen & Hambrick, 1995; Deephouse, 1999).
Thus, for publicly traded firms, institutional theory (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983)
predicts that as firms seek cognitive legitimization (Ensley & Hmieleski, 2005; Suchman,
1995), analyst and capital market actors will respond in kind to their quest for legitimacy
and demand greater information and apply increased coercive pressure as a result of the
legitimization process. As such, I propose that this will lead firms to adopt a TMT
structure that includes a CMO because the presence of a CMO will provide analysts and
capital market actors access to unique insights and information about the firm’s
intangible assets, such as marketing strategies, or higher levels of customer satisfaction
(Barth et al., 1998; Luo, Homburg, & Wieseke, 2010), ultimately meeting the analysts’
demands for greater information. Thus, I propose the following:
H1: Firm visibility is positively related to firm adoption of a TMT structure that
includes a CMO.
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Market Power and CMO Presence in the Firm
Market power reflects a firm’s ability to influence the actions of others in a
product-market (Harrigan, 1983; Makhija, 2003; Shervani, Frazier, & Challagalla, 2007).
A firm’s market power is a joint function of its horizontal and vertical clout and the
capabilities of its internal departments (Steiner, 2008). Market power can be acquired
simply by virtue of size; by definition, large organizations enjoy greater market power
than small firms (Boone, Carroll, & Van Witteloostuijn, 2004; Haveman, 1993). Market
power can result from the presence of structural barriers that deter entry for new
competition or target markets derived from industry characteristics (Bain, 1956; Morris,
1996). Fewer producers also result in a concentration of market power (Alvarado,
Overbye, & Sauer, 1999).
To enhance firm market power, firms must (1) differentiate their product offerings
(Porter, 1980) and (2) effectively communicate their product’s unique advantage to
customers (Andras & Srinivasan, 2003). These two tasks call for skill and experience in
segmentation, targeting, and positioning (Nath & Mahajan, 2008), key domains of the
marketing function.
Ultimately, market power is the ability of firms to elevate price above marginal
cost to earn economic profits in excess of competitive levels (Cotterill, Franklin, & Ma,
1996), or what economists call “rents.” According to the U.S. Department of Justice and
Federal Trade Commission (1992), a firm possesses market power when it can maintain
prices above competitive levels and profitably keep them elevated for a significant
period.
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To do this, Kerin, Mahajan, and Varadarajan (1990) suggest firms selectively
choose markets in which to compete and strategically deploy their resources, such as
advertising, to exploit their market power to achieve effective product differentiation.
Advertising intensity is widely acknowledged as an effective and efficient method to
achieve product differentiation, increasing firm profit levels (Connor & Mueller, 1982).
Porter (1976) empirically demonstrates the capacity of advertising to differentiate
products, elevate profits, and create barriers to entry.
Likewise, research and development (R&D) is a valuable strategic asset that
enables firms to generate superior return on investments (Chesbrough, 2003). However, it
is the simultaneous investment in higher levels of R&D and advertising relative to
industry norms that enables firms to engage in effective product differentiation,
generating superior organizational performance (Krishnan, Tadepalli, & Park, 2009).
Thus, the literature suggests that market power is related to the firm’s ability to
achieve differentiation (Hay, 2008; Matraves & Rondi, 2007; Morris, 1996), and
differentiation is related to the likelihood of CMO presence on a firm’s TMT (Nath &
Mahajan, 2008). Moreover, the strategic and tactical deployment of the firm’s valuable
resources falls within the domain of the marketing function (Hyde, Landry & Tipping,
2004) but is best leveraged by “corporate-level distinctive competencies” (Hitt & Ireland,
1985, p. 289). Thus, I propose the following:
H2: Firm market power is positively related to firm adoption of a TMT structure
that includes a CMO.
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Industry Orientation and CMO Presence in the Firm
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) assert that isomorphism is promoted through
intensified interaction within an organizational field, commonly an industry. From this
perspective, industry characteristics become constraints within which firms adapt or
perish (Aldrich, 1979; Christensen & Montgomery, 1981; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967).
Meyer and Rowan (1977) propose that a significant amount of organizational structure is
due to environmental pressures and/or the desire for legitimacy (which is achieved
through conformity with institutional and cultural environments of the firm). Lees (1997)
extends the perspective that the major determinants of organizational structure lie outside
(rather than inside) the organization and proposes that as organizations become more
isomorphic, eventually they must behave as their environment dictates to maintain
legitimacy. Evidence also suggests that institutional pressures to organize in certain ways
are stronger in some industries than in others (Boeker, 1989; Eisenhardt, 1988; Palmer,
Jennings, & Zhou, 1993).
Industry orientation, relative to the degree of differentiation inherent within an
industry, can lead to environmental pressure that, in turn, influences firm choices. For
example, highly differentiated industries, such as high-technology, provide the firm more
avenues for competition and a broader array of possible competitive actions (Porter,
1980), but they are also more dependent on discretionary consumer consumption than
others (McGahan & Porter, 1997). Firms competing in highly differentiated industries
tend to seek ways to differentiate their offerings; as such, they often concentrate their
resources like R&D on product innovations (Plehn-Dujowich, 2009) rather than on
improving efficiencies.
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Industry effects also exist at the corporate level (Hitt & Ireland, 1985). However,
only a few studies (Datta, Guthrie, & Rajagopalan, 2002; Datta & Rajagopalan, 1998;
Guthrie & Olian, 1991; Pfeffer & Leblebici, 1973; Rajagopalan & Datta, 1996) have
examined the role of industry in executive staffing decisions such as those of the TMT.
Researchers have long suggested and supported the importance of functional diversity in
the TMT (Michel & Hambrick, 1992; Pegels, Song, & Yang, 2000; Weinzimmer, 2000;
Weinzimmer, Bond, Houston, & Nystrom, 2003; Wiersema & Bantel, 1992). Functional
diversity on the TMT has been shown to stimulate wider discussion and debate about the
different ways to focus the activities of the company and leads to more innovative,
higher-quality solutions (Bantel & Jackson, 1989; Hambrick, Cho, & Ming-Jer, 1996).
Functional diversity and expertise serve as the lens through which the TMT views,
interprets, and makes sense of the business environment (Day & Lord, 1992).
Leveraging functional expertise in the TMT, particularly marketing expertise, has
been linked to the creation of shareholder value (Weinzimmer et al., 2003). The presence
of marketing expertise on the TMT is believed to play a unique role by focusing firm
attention and resources on the consumer, assessing market attractiveness, and developing
strategic assets through innovation (Bantel & Jackson, 1989; Day, 1992; Kerin, 2005;
Webster, 1992; Weinzimmer et al., 2003). The success of firms competing in
differentiated industries is dependent on producing products that stand out from
competitors’ products on product features, quality, and design (Guthrie & Datta, 2008).
Marketing’s role is to create differentiation, preference, and loyalty (Webster, 1992).
These factors fall within the purview of a CMO because marketing is the corporate area
that best knows and understands the firm’s customers (Kumar & Shah, 2009). The
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presence of a CMO on the TMT provides critical insights into customer-linking
capabilities (Nath & Mahajan, 2008). Finally, the appointment of a CMO is valued by
investors (Boyd et al., 2010). For these reasons, I hypothesize that firms competing in
differentiated industries are more likely to have a CMO on the TMT:
H3: Firm industry orientation (differentiation) is positively related to firm
adoption of a TMT that includes a CMO.

Industry Orientation, Market Power, and CMO Presence on TMTs
In addition to a direct effect, industry orientation (i.e., differentiation) may also
affect the firm’s decision of whether the TMT structure should include a CMO through
moderation of a firm’s market power. Findings in previous research suggest at least three
reasons to believe so. First, differentiated industries provide the firm a broader range of
competitive actions (Porter, 1980) than market power alone. Second, a host of
endogenous and exogenous variables may influence the ability of firms within
differentiated industries to generate market power. Examples of these variables include
profit margin, market size, frequency of purchase, buyer knowledge ability, number of
brands, barriers to entry, and the manner in which goods are sold (Andras & Srinivasan,
2003; Farris & Albion, 1981; Porter, 1980). Third, as the degree of differentiation
increases and innovation spreads, powerful forces emerge in the form of isomorphism
that cause firms to become more similar in their output and structure (DiMaggio &
Powell, 1983).
Furthermore, previous research suggests that differentiated industries provide an
environment that may enhance market power. Marketing expertise is more valuable in
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industries with greater competition (Kohli & Jaworski, 1990) and when industry
instability increases (Pasa & Shugan, 1996), such as in highly differentiated industries.
For example, Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) find that the marketing function provides a
greater contribution to firm outcomes in the differentiated food processing industry than
in the commoditized plastics industry. Fornell and Johnson (1993) empirically find that
differentiated industries rate systematically higher in perceived product performance and
subsequent consumer satisfaction. Product performance and consumer satisfaction are
antecedents of a firm’s ability to earn higher-than-normal profit margins, thereby creating
market power (Fornell, Mithas, Morgeson, & Krishnan, 2006; Reichheld & Sasser,
1990). Within the differentiated soft-drink industry, Cotterill et al. (1996) conclude that
market power is largely due to product differentiation, a primary domain of marketing,
and the CMO position (Nath & Mahajan, 2008). Moreover, industries with high product
differentiability also provide greater managerial discretion and value experimentation and
are a proving ground for new strategies (Datta et al., 2002). Of note, Nath and Mahajan
(2008) find that a differentiation strategy at the firm level is also related to the likelihood
of a CMO presence on the TMT.
Prior research also suggests that in differentiated industries, TMTs include a
CMO to (1) increase legitimacy (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), (2) attract greater and
higher-quality resources (Baum & Oliver, 1991; Heugens & Lander, 2009), and (3)
increase the likelihood that the firm will select the primary differentiating attribute that
most buyers in the industry perceive as important and unique, which in turn will garner
the firm above-average profits (Porter, 1985), further enhancing market power.
For these reasons, I hypothesize the following:
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H4: The positive relationship between firm market power and presence of a CMO
on the TMT is moderated by industry orientation such that within highly
differentiated industries the positive relationship is stronger, but in lower
differentiated industries, the relationship is weaker.

METHODOLOGY
Design
This paper uses hierarchical logistic regression to examine both continuous
environmental variables that predict the presence of a CMO on the TMT. The time frame
selected for this sample is calendar year 2010 and 2011. In selecting these two full year
periods, I avoid observed noise and financial turmoil associated with issues arising from
the 2007–2009 economic crises while providing a current reflection of the TMT structure
among U.S. firms.

Data Sources
The data for Hypothesis H1, H2, H3 and H4 was drawn from the secondary data
source Capital IQ, in accordance with prior research examining TMT and environmental
conditions (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1993; Rajagopalan & Prescott, 1990; Vergne, 2011).
Additional data was obtained from annual reports, 10K reports, and other public sources,
including Morningstar.com. This data included TMT size in accordance with prior
research (Nath & Mahajan, 2008) and verification of the presence or absence of a CMO
on the TMT within the periods examined.
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The use of secondary data, public databases, and business press to acquire
information on publicly traded firms is consistent with prior TMT and organizational
literature (e.g., Anderson & Reeb, 2004; Boyd et al., 2010; Cannella, Park, & Lee, 2008;
Nath & Mahajan, 2008; Pearce & Zahra, 1992; Reichert, Lockett, & Rao, 1996; Sullivan,
Haunschild, & Page, 2007). Consistent with other studies using similar data sources
(McGahan & Porter, 1997), this analysis excludes private firms because the data
necessary to conduct the analysis as modeled, such as advertising investment or sales
revenue, is not in the public domain.

Sample and Sample Size
The data set consists of a random sample of firms with and without a titled CMO
present on the TMT from among 11,017 public U.S. firms one year or older. This sample
includes firms across 10 different industry groups from the Capital IQ database, using
two-digit Global Industry Classification System (GICS) codes, developed jointly by
Standard & Poor’s and Morgan Stanley’s Capital International. Bhojraj, Lee, and Oler
(2003) suggest that GICS is significantly better than the other three classification
schemes at explaining cross-sectional variations, forecasted and realized growth rates,
R&D expenditures, and other key financial ratios across large-cap, mid-cap, and smallcap firms. Thus, GICS is employed for this examination because it is more homogeneous
than older Standard Industrial Classification codes, the North America Import Database,
and the Fama–French classification system (Fama & French, 1997). Furthermore, prior
research has shown that GICS codes are more parsimonious, better improve explanatory
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power, and have a greater correlation across industry peer firms than the Fama–French
algorithm (Chan, Lakonishok, & Swaminathan, 2007).
However, unlike prior research that limits sample size to firms reporting total
sales revenue of at least $250 million (Hambrick & Cannella, 2004; Nath & Mahajan,
2008), my sample was drawn from all publicly traded U.S. firms, regardless of sales
volume, and provided all necessary data points so as not to constrain the data set
artificially or ignore the presence of CMOs in smaller or newly established firms.
In accordance with Hair, Black, Babin, and Anderson (2010), a random sub-set of
firms were created to both ensure that the primary data set is representative of the
population and provide a manner for validating the logistic models tested. For example,
the mean natural log of firm age for the population of U.S. public companies between
2010 and 2011 was 1.43 compared to a mean of 1.48 for the analysis sample data set and
for the validating sample set.
Because the nature of analysis for H1, H2, H3, and H4 is logistic regression, a
larger sample size was required (Hair et al., 2010). Thus, 1,218 observations were
obtained. Twenty seven observations with missing data were discarded, including all 5
observations in the Utilities industry. The Schweinle method was then used to identify
outliers (2.5 standard deviations from mean), 44 were discarded, resulting in a total
sample size of 1,147.1
A random sample of approximately 50% of the observations containing a CMO
was combined with a random sample of 50% of the observations without a CMO,
The composition of the analysis sample by industry using two-digit GICS codes was 10 firms in
Energy (GICS 10), 31 in Materials (GICS 15), 84 in Industrials (GICS 20), 138 in Consumer
Discretionary (GICS 25), 32 in Consumer Staples (GICS 30), 115 in Health Care (GIC35), 18 in
Financials (GICS 40), 139 in Information Technology (GICS 45), and 5 in Telecommunication
Services (GICS 50).
1

21

resulting in 572 observations designated as the analysis sample. The remaining 575
observations were designated as the validation sample in accordance with Hair et al.
(2010) to establish external validity, assess the predictive accuracy, and provide insight
into generalizability of the logistic model. In line with prior research, each sample
exceeds the recommended size for logistic regression analysis (greater than 400) (Hosmer
& Lemeshow, 2000) and the minimum size (375) necessary to be representative of the
total population of U.S. firms (Krejcie & Morgan, 1970).
The analysis sample contained 131 observations with a CMO present comprising
22.9% of the sample, while the validation sample contained 130 observations with a
CMO present, or 22.6% of the total sample. These proportions were directionally similar
to reported findings by Nash and Mahajan (2008) of 19.6% for firms that had a titled
CMO on the TMT.

Dependent Variable
The dependent variable of interest is the presence or absence of a CMO on the
TMT. In keeping with prior research (e.g., Boyd et al., 2010), this condition was
identified through use of titled positions that expressly stated “chief marketing officer.”
Hambrick and Mason (1984) suggest that researchers can identify members of the TMT
simply by equating executive titles with membership in the TMT. For the purpose of this
study, CMO presence on the TMT was coded as 1, and CMO absence was coded as 0.
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Explanatory Variables
The predictor variables examined were firm visibility (FV), market power (MP),
and industry orientation (IO). In addition, one moderating variable was created to test the
moderating influence of industry orientation on the relationship between market power
and CMO presence on the TMT.

Firm Visibility
In line with prior research (Ackert & Athanassakos, 2001; Baker et al., 1999;
Barron, Byard, Kile, & Riedl, 2002), the construct of firm visibility (FV) used two
measures: the number of institutional shares outstanding (NOI) and the number of
institutional shareholders (NOS). Baker et al. (1999) define firm visibility as the extent,
to which analysts follow, and institutions hold, a firm’s stock. Ackert and Athanassakos
(2001) suggest that these measures are relevant and widely accepted proxies for firm
visibility. Thus, in line with prior research (Baker et al., 1999), the construct of firm
visibility was measured as the number of institutional shares outstanding (NOI) and the
number of institutional shareholders (NOS) at the close of each year observed. Because
H1 examines a theoretical construct composed of multiple inputs of different numeric
ranges, the geometric mean was calculated to reflect firm visibility.

Market Power
The construct of firm market power (MP) was examined by combining two
measures: advertising intensity (AI) and R&D intensity (RI). Advertising intensity (AI)
was measured by annual advertising expenses divided by annual sales revenue less
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industry median advertising expenses (Nath & Mahajan, 2008). McAlister, Srinivasan,
and Kim (2007) find that advertising intensity affects the systematic risk and return of the
firm.
Research intensity (RI) was measured by annual R&D expenses divided by
annual sales less industry median R&D expenses (Nath & Mahajan, 2008). Prior studies
examining (RI) have found that R&D expenditures affect systematic risk of the firm and
analyst recommendations (Barth, Kasznik, & McNichols, 2001; McAlister et al., 2007).
Andras and Srinivasan (2003) suggest that advertising intensity is greater in consumer
product firms but research intensity (RI) is greater in manufacturing product firms; they
also find that both (AI) and (RI) are positively related to firms’ profit margins (Krishnan,
Tadepalli, & Park, 2009). Thus, in line with prior research (Andras & Srinivasan, 2003;
Krishnan, Tadepalli, & Park, 2009), the construct of market power was measured as the
combination of a firm’s (AI) and (RI) for each year observed because both have been
found to contribute to a firm’s market power. Because H2 examines a theoretical
construct composed of multiple inputs of different numeric ranges, the geometric mean
was calculated to reflect firm market power.

Industry Orientation
Finally, industry orientation was examined by measuring the degree of
differentiation within each industry. Differentiated industries typically provide a wide
variety of products or services that meet the needs and desires of heterogeneous
customers (Grönroos, 1983). Conversely, lesser differentiated industries refer to
industries that provide primary goods or services that are perceived as close substitutes
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for one another (Bannock & Baxter, 2011). Industries with higher advertising intensity
are deemed to be highly differentiated while those with lower advertising intensity are
characterized as having low differentiation. Firm membership was ascertained by means
of the six-digit industry code representing each firm’s dominant line of business, as
classified by GICS. Consistent with Hull & Rothenberg (2008), industry orientation was
measured using the average advertising intensity in each firm’s industry for the period
examined. Thus, industry orientation as reflected by the degree of differentiation was
measured by the geometric mean of two years of advertising intensity by industry then
standardized using Z-score transformation to reflect the degree of differentiation among
industries within the sample.

Control Variables
In accordance with prior research (Collins & Clark, 2003; Eaton & Rosen, 1983;
Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996; Nath & Mahajan, 2008), five control variables were used:
firm size, firm age, TMT size, whether a CEO was an outsider or an insider before
appointment to the position, and industry membership. Firm size was included as a
control variable because it addresses the likelihood that large firms enjoy more resource
advantages than small firms (Collins & Clark, 2003), which may influence both human
resource policies and firm performance (Jackson & Schuler, 1995). The construct of firm
size is widely represented in extant research, which has operationalized it using several
quantitative methods, including total sales (Ciscell & Carroll, 1980; Murphy, 1985) and
book value of net assets (Eaton & Rosen, 1983; Prasad, 1974; Rajagopalan & Prescott,
1990). However, the construct of firm size is most commonly measured by the number of
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employees (Eaton & Rosen, 1983; Murphy, 1985). In line with previous research (Boyd
et al., 2010; Covin, Green, & Slevin, 2006; Nath & Mahajan, 2008; Newbert, 2007), I
measured firm size as the total number of firm employees.
Prior research has also found that firm age influences a firm’s capabilities (e.g.,
Autio, Sapienza & Almeida, 2000; Finkle, 1998; Park, Mezias, & Song, 2004), so it was
included as a control variable. Controlling for firm age can also help address differences
in ownership structure (Eisenberg, Sundgren, & Wells, 1998) and firm growth rates
(Delmar, Davidsson, & Gartner, 2003; Loderer & Waelchli, 2010). Firm age was
measured by the number of years a firm has been in business (Ensley & Hmieleski,
2005).
Top management team size has been operationalized by prior researchers in many
ways, as observed by Carpenter, Geletkanyez, and Sanders (2004). It typically reflects the
top two tiers of the organization’s management—that is, CEO, chairman, COO, and chief
financial officer and the next-highest management tier (Carpenter, 2002; Finkelstein &
Hambrick, 1996; Wiersema & Bantel, 1992). TMT size helps determine the nature of a
TMT’s information-processing and decision-making capabilities (Haleblian &
Finkelstein, 1993) and pertains to the complexity TMT executives encounter (Henderson
& Fredrickson, 1996). Following prior research (Nath & Mahajan, 2008), TMT size was
defined as the number of executive officers specified by a firm in the 10-K or proxy, its
annual mandatory filings with the Securities Exchange Commission. The mean size of
the TMT in the analysis sample was 9.37, and the standard deviation was 2.7, which was
consistent with prior research findings (Nath & Mahajan, 2008). Controlling for TMT
size is also in accordance with Carpenter, Geletkanycz, and Sanders’s (2004) call for
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research to examine the effects of the TMT on firm outcomes by controlling for team
size. Failure to control for TMT size may confound results, making it difficult to discern
whether the results should be attributed to heterogeneity or team size (Carpenter &
Fredrickson, 2001; Carpenter et al., 2004).
Whether a CEO was an outsider or an insider before appointment was also
included as a control variable because this factor has been associated with the likelihood
of CMO presence in the TMT (Nath & Mahajan, 2008). Firm-specific operational
experience has helped explain other TMT staffing decisions. For example, Hambrick and
Cannella (2004) find that CEOs who lack firm-specific experience are more likely to
have a COO than insider CEOs. Therefore, in accordance with prior research, a dummy
variable was created and coded as 1 if the CEO had firm tenure longer than a year and 0
if the CEO had spent less than one year with the firm before appointment to CEO.
Finally, prior research (Lees, 1997; Meyer & Rowan, 1977) contends controlling
for industry membership is necessary to capture the effects of industry-level variables on
organizational structure such as whether or not a CMO is present on the TMT. For this
reason, my study included industry dummy variables, coded as 1 for industry
membership and 0 for non-membership. Industry membership was ascertained by means
of the two-digit industry code as classified by GICS. Industries represented in the sample
include: Energy, Materials, Industrials, Consumer Discretionary, Consumer Staples,
Health Care, Financials, Information Technology, and Telecommunication Services.
However, the Energy and Telecommunications industries were excluded as control
variables because there were 10 or fewer observations in both the validation and analysis
sample (Hair et al., 2010).
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Analysis
Because H1, H2, H3, and H4 examine the relationship between the explanatory
variables and a qualitative dependent variable to determine the likelihood of CMO
presence on the TMT, hierarchical logistic regression was used. Logistic regression
assumes a categorical dependent variable with a binomial distribution. Prior research has
deemed this manner of analysis appropriate (Hair et al., 2010; Matta & Beamish, 2008;
Press & Wilson, 1978). Table 1 provides descriptive statistics and correlations.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
.271***
.086*
.299***
.059
.406***
.033
.91*
.085*

1

3

.283***
.339*** .313***
.071*
.005
.380*** .266***
-.051
-.136**
.048
.069*
.053
.001

2

.001
.510***
.009
.133**
.038

4

-.032
-.025
-.067
-.028

5

-.021
.119**
.034

6

.036
.068

7

n = 572
*p < .05
**p < .01
***p < .000
CMO Presence: 1 = Present, 0 = Absent.
CEO appointment history: 1 = Insider, 0 = Outsider
To minimize positive skewness, variables 6, and 7 were logarithmically transformed prior to analysis. Geometric mean and standard deviation are reported in Table 1.
To reflect relative degrees of differentiation within industry orientation, variable 8 was converted to a Z-score prior to analysis.
Firm market power and industry orientation less industry median ratios.

Variables
Minimum
Maximum
Mean
s.d.
CMO Presence
0.000
1.000
0.230
0.421
Firm Size
1.000 440885.000 14348.390 49865.554
Firm Age
1.000
251.000
43.190
37.224
TMT Size
1.000
20.000
9.370
2.731
CEO Appointment History
0.000
1.000
0.690
0.463
Firm Visibility
31.623 3508317.815 150688.264 312044.409
Firm Market Power
0.441
215.432
9.695
15.011
Industry Orientation
0.000
0.009
0.001
0.001
Industry Orientation x Firm Market Power-0.049
0.177
0.001
0.010

Table 1
Paper 1 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations

-.037

8
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Before the hierarchical logistic regression was conducted, bivariate correlations
were examined in the analysis sample. Except for the correlation between the control
variable TMT size and the independent variable firm visibility (r = .510), no other
bivariate correlations approached the .70 threshold when collinearity begins to distort
model estimation (Dorman et al., 2013; Hair et al., 2010). A similar correlation (r = .525)
was observed between the same variables in the validation sample. However, the analysis
sample and the validation sample each exceeded 250 observations; Mason and Perreault
(1991) suggest bivariate correlations greater than .70 have minimal effect on the ability of
a model to draw correct inferences. Variance inflation factor (VIF) scores for both the
analysis sample and the validation sample were then compared with the suggested cutoff
threshold of 10 (Hair et al., 2010; Tull & Hawkins, 1990; Lehmann, Gupta, & Steckel,
1988). The independent variables were examined for multicollinearity; no variable had a
standard error larger than 1.0, and no variable was found to have a VIF score above 3,
well below the suggested cutoff value of 10 (Hair et al., 2010). Because logistic
regression was employed, heteroskedasticity was not a concern (Hair et al., 2010).
Table 2 reflects the hierarchical logistic regression results from the analysis
sample. Model 1A contains the test results from the control variables on CMO
presence/absence. Model 1B contains the results from the independent variables firm
visibility, market power, and industry orientation (Model 1B) on CMO presence/absence.
Model 1C contains the results of the hypothesized moderating relationship of industry
orientation on the relationship between market power and CMO presence/absence.
Variables used in the creation of the interaction terms were centered before analysis
(Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003).
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Table 2
Predicting CMO Presence on TMTs
Hierarchical Logistic Regression Analysis
Variables
Step 1: Constant
Step 2: Control Variables
Firm Size
Firm Age
TMT Size
CEO Appointment History
Industry Dummy - Materials
Industry Dummy - Industrials
Industry Dummy - Consumer Discretionary
Industry Dummy - Consumer Staples
Industry Dummy - Healthcare
Industry Dummy - Finance
Industry Dummy - IT

Model 1A
β
eβ
-12.094***
(3.385)

.000**
-.003
.238***
-.154
2.027*
1.974**
.769
.633
2.595***
1.223
.427

Step 3: Main Effects
Firm Visibility
Market Power
Industry Orientation

(.000)
(.003)
(.046)
(.253)
(.830)
(.634)
(.565)
(.684)
(.679)
(.777)
(.557)

Model 1B
β
eβ
-10.087**
(3.742)

.000
-.005
.073
-.415
1.707
2.299**
.541
.467
2.734***
.850
.372

(.000)
(.004)
(.050)
(.280)
(.882)
(.705)
(.626)
(.783)
(.743)
(.856)
(.616)

.000
-.005
.070
-.422
1.745*
2.350**
.618
.394
2.797***
.841
.428

(.000)
(.004)
(.051)
(.280)
(.881)
(.710)
(.626)
(.794)
(.749)
(.854)
(.617)

2.175***
1.503**
.080

(.321)
(.529)
(.109)

2.175***
1.290*
.057

(.322)
(.547)
(.119)

Step 4: Moderated Variables
Industry Orientation X Firm Market Power
Chi square
Negelkerke R Square
Percent correctly classified

Model 1C
β
eβ
-10.208**
(3.758)

.748
115.928
.278
79.4%

188.330
.426
81.8%

(.485)

190.953
.431
81.6%

n = 572
77.1% Predicted percentage classification without model inputs.
Primary sample reported.
CMO Presence: 1=Present, 0=Absent.
CEO Appointment History: 1=Insider, -1=Outsider
Unstandardized coefficients and standard error reported.
*=.05,**=.01, ***=.001 one-tailed test

As Table 2 shows, the first part in the hierarchical logistic regression (Model 1A)
included only the control variables. Goodness-of-fit as measured by -2 log likelihood for
Model 1A was 499.648. Among the control variables, firm size (β = .000, p = .005), TMT
size (β = .238, p = .000), the industry dummy variable for materials (β = 2.027, p = .015),
industrials (β = 1.974, p = .002), and healthcare (β = 2.595, p = .000) were found to be
significant using a one-tailed test. Model 1A, including the constant and the control
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variables, had a classification accuracy rate of 79.4% of the cases and Nagelkerke
pseudo-R-square of .278.
The second part of the hierarchical logistic regression (Model 1B) measured the
direct effects of the independent variables. The addition of firm visibility, market power,
and industry orientation to the model resulted in a significant change in the classification
accuracy from 79.4% to 81.8% compared to Model 1A, reflecting the enhanced
predictability of Model 1B compared to Model 1A. Goodness-of-fit as measured by -2
log likelihood for Model 1B was 427.245, a lower value than Model 1A, representing a
better model fit (Hair et al., 2010). Regarding the direct effect of the independent
variables on CMO presence/absence on the TMT, firm visibility was positive and
statistically significant (β = 2.175, p = .000), market power was positive and statistically
significant (β = 1.503, p = .004), while industry orientation was positive but not
statistically significant (β = .080, p = .466). Model 1B had a Nagelkerke pseudo-R-square
of 0.426. The increase of the value of Nagelkerke pseudo-R-square closer to 1.0 also
indicates Model 1B is a better fit than Model 1A (Hair et al., 2010).
The third part of the hierarchical logistic regression (Model 1C) measured the
interaction effect of industry orientation on market power and CMO presence/absence on
the TMT. The addition of the moderating variable represented no meaningful
improvement in model fit as measured by -2 log likelihood (424.623) or classification
accuracy (81.6%) over the main effects Model 1B. Model 1C had a Nagelkerke pseudoR-square of 0.431. The interaction was positive but non-significant (β = .748, p = .123).
Thus, the addition of the moderating variable industry orientation on the relationship
between market power and CMO presence did not enhance model fit.
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The logistic regression coefficients reported in Model 1B show that firm visibility
was positive and significant (β = 2.175, p <.001). Thus, the findings support H1: Firm
visibility is positively related to firm adoption of a TMT structure that includes a CMO.
For H2, the logistic regression coefficients show that market power was positive and
significant (β = 1.503, p < .010). Thus, this finding supports H2: Firm market power is
positively related to firm adoption of a TMT structure that includes a CMO. For H3, the
logistic regression coefficients show that industry orientation was positive but nonsignificant (β = .080, p > .050). Thus, this finding does not support H3: Firm industry
orientation (differentiation) is positively related to firm adoption of a TMT that includes
a CMO.
The logistic regression coefficients reported in Model 1C were non-significant (β
= .748, p >.050). Thus, H4, which predicted: The positive relationship between firm
market power and presence of a CMO on the TMT is moderated by industry orientation
such that within differentiated industries the positive relationship is stronger, but in nondifferentiated industries, the relationship is weaker, was not supported.
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Figure 2
Interaction between Industry Orientation and Market Power on CMO Presence

Figure 2 indicates the interaction effect between industry orientation and market
power on CMO presence on the TMT. The coefficient for this interaction term is nonsignificant (p > .050). However, the interaction charted suggests that in situations where
market power is high and industry orientation is highly differentiated, industry orientation
amplifies the relationship between market power and CMO presence, but when industry
orientation is undifferentiated, it does not.
While prior literature has not offered specific rules that are applicable to reporting
logistic regression (Peng, Lee, & Ingersoll, 2002), reporting validation results is an
important test of internal validity (Bagley, White, & Golomb, 2001). Thus, the results
from analysis of the validation sample are provided in Appendix 1. As reported, the
validation sample confirmed each of these findings.
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Finally, my study operationalized CMO presence on the TMT (someone expressly
holding the title of Chief Marketing Officer) differently than Nath and Mahajan (2008).2
As such, additional analysis was conducted on both the analysis and validation sample to
examine each hypothesis using the broader definition of a CMO. Using this broader
definition and the analysis sample, I found that the classification accuracy of Model 1A
was 68.2%, Model 1B was 70.1%, and Model 1C was 69.9%. Of the variables of interest,
I found only firm visibility to be positive and significant, (β = .557, p = .001). Firm
market power was positive but non-significant (β = .337, p = .316) while industry
orientation was negative and non-significant (β = -.121, p = .238). The moderating
variable industry orientation on the relationship between market power and CMO
presence was negative and non-significant (β = -070, p = .844). Analysis of the validation
sample using the broader definition of a CMO also confirmed findings from the analysis
sample. Firm visibility was positive and significant (β = .599, p = .000), market power
was positive but non-significant (β = .281, p = .476), and industry orientation was
negative and non-significant (β = -.043, p = .700). The moderating variable industry
orientation on the relationship between market power and CMO presence was negative
and non-significant (β = -.020, p = .965). As a result, only hypothesis H1 was supported
using the broader definition of a CMO. Findings from the analysis sample and the
validation sample using the broader definition of a CMO are reported in Appendixes 2
and 3, respectively.

2

Nath and Mahajan (2008) operationalize CMO presence as any executive on the TMT
with the term “marketing” in his or her title. In addition to chief marketing officer, titles
included vice president marketing, senior vice president marketing, or executive vice
president marketing (Nath & Mahajan, 2008).
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DISCUSSION
This study began in an attempt to explain why some firms have a CMO on the
TMT while others do not. Prior research (Nath & Mahajon, 2008) has identified several
internal factors that predict CMO presence; however, little to no empirical evidence
existed examining the firm’s external environment. As suggested by scholarly literature
(Cyert & March, 1963; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), the application of institutional theory
is deemed to be appropriate in both examining the external environment of the firm as
well as predicting managerial structures of the firm, such as the presence of a CMO in the
TMT.
Thus, this study leverages the explanatory power of institutional theory in
theorizing that structural isomorphism is a significant determinant of the adoption of
managerial structures that include a CMO on the TMT when firms seek to obtain,
maintain, or increase firm legitimacy. Specifically, this study examines three
environmental constructs under which a CMO may be more likely to be present in the
TMT of a firm: firm visibility, firm market power, and industry orientation (i.e.,
differentiation).
The study hypothesized (H1) that firm visibility was positively related to firm
adoption of a TMT structure that includes a CMO. It hypothesized (H2) that firm market
power is positively related to firm adoption of a TMT structure that includes a CMO. It
hypothesized (H3) that industry orientation (differentiation) was positively related to firm
adoption of a TMT structure that includes a CMO. Finally, the study hypothesized (H4)
that the relationship between firm market power and the presence of a CMO on the TMT
was moderated by industry orientation (differentitation) such that within differentiated
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industries the positive relationship is stronger, but in non-differentiated industries, the
relationship is weaker. The lack of significance of this finding may have occurred
because a threshold had been reached beyond which mimetic behavior failed to provide
the firm incremental benefits, such as legitimacy or firm performance (Meyer & Rowan,
1977).
This study found that a CMO was more likely to be present on the TMT of firms
that have greater firm visibility, thus hypothesis 1 was supported. This study also found
that a CMO was more likely to be present on the TMT when firms have greater market
power; thus, hypothesis 2 was supported. However, this study found no support that a
CMO was more likely to be present on the TMT when firms operated in differentiated
industries or when firms with high market power operated in differentiated industries.
Thus, hypotheses 3 and 4 were not supported.

Contributions
The contribution of this study is that it extends the scope of scholarly inquiry,
from a marketing and management perspective, to provide significant new insights as to
the conditions under which a CMO is most likely to be present on a firm’s TMT. In doing
so, I was able to identify two previously unexamined conditions—firm visibility and
market power—that individually and collectively help predict and explain why some
TMTs have a CMO presence while others do not. Furthermore, by comparing TMTs
containing different marketing titles, I have demonstrated that there may be important
differences between a titled CMO and someone with “marketing” in their title on the
TMT.
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This finding suggests that future research examining the role and influence of a CMO
should examine both broad and narrow definitions of a CMO.

Managerial Implications
From this examination, three implications for managers arise. Foremost, managers
must recognize that the external environment of a firm can play an influential role in
shaping the managerial structure of a firm. Firm visibility and firm market power are just
two factors managers should consider. Secondly, managers should recognize that the
inclusion of a CMO on the TMT provides another way for the firm to meet the on-going
demand for firm-level information by capitol market actors. Third, these findings
empirically support prior research that suggested strategic and tactical deployment of a
firm’s valuable resources, such as market power, not only come under the marketing
function (Hyde, Landry, & Tipping, 2004) but are best leveraged by “corporate-level
distinctive competencies” (Hitt & Ireland, 1985, p. 289). Thus, the presence of a CMO on
the TMT provides unique functional support to the TMT that leads to empowerment of
the firm to better address market-related complexity.

Limitations
One of the primary limitations of this study was the limited presence of a CMO
across all industries equally. Another limiting factor was that many firms did not publicly
report all measures necessary to conduct this analysis. As a result, I omitted firms that did
not fully report key metrics such as those that did not report at least one measure for
market power. Similarly, the degree of differentiation captured by industry was
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constrained by the total number of firms within the industry reporting advertising
investment. By virtue of the variables studied, such as the number of shares outstanding,
the sample was limited to publicly traded firms. The data set was also limited to U.S.
firms and observations taken within a two year period. Overcoming the limitations of this
study such as conducting similar research in other countries or surveying similar
measures from private firms could prove beneficial in extending the generalizability of
this model.

Future Research
The findings of this study lead to additional questions for future research.
Foremost, what other environmental factors besides firm visibility and market power
might influence CMO presence on the TMT? Market complexity might be one such
factor to be examined. Does the managerial structure of international firms mirror that of
U.S. firms when faced with similar environmental pressure? Another area that warrants
further examination is the perceived and operational differences between a CMO and
other senior marketing titles such as Vice President of Marketing. The outcome of this
study suggests differences do exist between a titled CMO and someone with “marketing”
in their title on the TMT. Understanding these differences could further aid firms in
decisions about TMT structure. Last, would a different theory, such as contingency or
signaling theory, suggest other factors that might influence the presence or absence of a
CMO on the TMT?
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Conclusion
Institutional theory applied in a marketing context provides a solid framework
upon which to examine environmental factors that may influence managerial structure
and behavior such as the adoption of a CMO on the TMT. Firm visibility and market
power are two such factors that help predict and explain the presence of a CMO on the
TMT.
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Appendix 1 - Validation Sample
Predicting CMO Presence on TMTs
Hierarchical Logistic Regression Analysis
Variables
Step 1: Constant
Step 2: Control Variables
Firm Size
Firm Age
TMT Size
CEO Appointment History
Industry Dummy - Materials
Industry Dummy - Industrials
Industry Dummy - Consumer Discretionary
Industry Dummy - Consumer Staples
Industry Dummy - Healthcare
Industry Dummy - Finance
Industry Dummy - IT

Model 1A
β
eβ
-3.343
(3.341)

.000**
-.003
.190***
-.393
.716
.790
-.703
-.654
1.541*
-.666
-.953

(.000)
(.003)
(.047)
(.255)
(.811)
(.661)
(.554)
(.707)
(.694)
(.808)
(.560)

Step 3: Main Effects
Firm Visibility
Market Power
Industry Orientation

Model 1B
β
eβ
-2.040
(3.659)

Model 1C
β
eβ
-1.914
(3.673)

.000
-.004
.044
-.293
.863
.743
-.931
-.710
1.835*
-.975
-.876

(.000)
(.004)
(.054)
(.269)
(.894)
(.714)
(.604)
(.786)
(.749)
(.884)
(.615)

.000
-.004
.045
-.283
.813
.707
-.945
-.688
1.831*
-1.031
-.894

(.000)
(.004)
(.055)
(.269)
(.892)
(.717)
(.606)
(.791)
(.750)
(.888)
(.618)

1.662***
1.228*
.094

(.270)
(.597)
(.130)

1.673***
1.195*
.106

(.270)
(.597)
(.137)

Step 4: Moderated Variables
Industry Orientation X Firm Market Power
Chi square
Negelkerke R Square
Percent correctly classified

.497
124.411
.296
82.1%

n = 575
77.2% Predicted percentage classification without model inputs.
Primary sample reported.
CMO Presence: 1=Present, 0=Absent.
CEO Appointment History: 1=Insider, -1=Outsider
Unstandardized coefficients and standard error reported.
*=.05,**=.01, ***=.001 one-tailed test

181.355
.411
83.0%

182.102
.412
83.0%

(.568)

55
Appendix 2 - Analysis Sample
Predicting CMO Presence on TMT Defined as Any Marketing Title on TMT
Hierarchical Logistic Regression Analysis
Variables
Step 1: Constant

Model 1A
β
eβ
-9.839**
(3.734)

Step 2: Control Variables
Firm Size
Firm Age
TMT Size
CEO Appointment History
Industry Dummy - Materials
Industry Dummy - Industrials
Industry Dummy - Consumer Discretionary
Industry Dummy - Consumer Staples
Industry Dummy - Healthcare
Industry Dummy - Finance
Industry Dummy - IT

.000**
-.007*
.193***
-.273
2.647**
1.079
.885
.216
2.048**
1.900*
.406

(.000)
(.003)
(.041)
(.209)
(.795)
(.647)
(.632)
(.744)
(.646)
(.769)
(.628)

Step 3: Main Effects
Firm Visibility
Market Power
Industry Orientation

Model 1B
β
eβ
-8.321**
(3.779)

.000
-.008*
.145**
-.265
2.595**
.978
.722
-.162
1.947**
1.626*
.359

(.000)
(.003)
(.044)
(.214)
(.804)
(.651)
(.641)
(.772)
(.650)
(.781)
(.633)

.000
-.008*
.145**
-.265
2.593**
.975
.716
-.150
1.939**
1.622*
.355

(.000)
(.003)
(.044)
(.214)
(.804)
(.652)
(.641)
(.774)
(.652)
(.781)
(.634)

.557**
.337
-.121

(.166)
(.336)
(.103)

.557**
.346
-.122

(.166)
(.340)
(.102)

-.070

(.356)

Step 4: Moderated Variables
Industry Orientation X Firm Market Power
Chi square
Negelkerke R Square
Percent correctly classified

130.098
.271
68.2%

n = 572
50.0% Predicted percentage classification without model inputs.
Primary sample reported.
CMO Presence: 1=Present, 0=Absent.
CEO Appointment History: 1=Insider, -1=Outsider
Unstandardized coefficients and standard error reported.
*=.05,**=.01, ***=.001 one-tailed test

Model 1C
β
eβ
-8.311**
(3.779)

143.709
.296
70.1%

143.748
.296
69.9%
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Appendix 3 - Validation Sample
Predicting CMO Presence on TMT Defined as Any Marketing Title on TMT
Hierarchical Logistic Regression Analysis
Variables
Step 1: Constant
Step 2: Control Variables
Firm Size
Firm Age
TMT Size
CEO Appointment History
Industry Dummy - Materials
Industry Dummy - Industrials
Industry Dummy - Consumer Discretionary
Industry Dummy - Consumer Staples
Industry Dummy - Healthcare
Industry Dummy - Finance
Industry Dummy - IT

Model 1A
β
eβ
.778
(2.803)

.000*
-.005
.188***
.002
.908
-.064
-1.007*
-1.338*
.291*
-.539
-1.485**

(.000)
(.003)
(.043)
(.205)
(.664)
(.507)
(.474)
(.640)
(.487)
(.725)
(.481)

Step 3: Main Effects
Firm Visibility
Market Power
Industry Orientation

Model 1B
β
eβ
-1.707
(2.910)

Model 1C
β
eβ
-1.705
(2.842)

.000
-.005
.121**
.055
.998
-.054
-1.062*
-1.496*
.371
-.833
-1.435**

.000
-.005
.121**
.054
.999
-.054
-1.062*
-1.496*
.370
-.831
-1.435**

.599***
.281
-.043

Step 4: Moderated Variables
Industry Orientation X Firm Market Power
Chi square
Negelkerke R Square
Percent correctly classified

121.361
.254
68.3%

n = 575
53.9% Predicted percentage classification without model inputs.
Primary sample reported.
CMO Presence: 1=Present, 0=Absent.
CEO Appointment History: 1=Insider, -1=Outsider
Unstandardized coefficients and standard error reported.
*=.05,**=.01, ***=.001 one-tailed test

137.804
.285
71.5%

(.000)
(.003)
(.046)
(.211)
(.678)
(.515)
(.479)
(.668)
(.494)
(.759)
(.490)

(.154)
(.394)
(.112)

(.000)
(.003)
(.046)
(.211)
(.678)
(.515)
(.479)
(.668)
(.494)
(.760)
(.490)

.599***
.280
-.043

(.154)
(.394)
(.112)

-.020

(.444)

137.806
.285
71.5%

CHAPTER 3

THE MODERATING INFLUENCE OF CMO PRESENCE ON THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN FIRM VISIBILITY, MARKET POWER, AND INDUSTRY
ORIENTATION AND FIRM PERFORMANCE

ABSTRACT

Over time, firms that match their top management team (TMT) structure to their
environmental context are more financially successful (Keck, 1997). Michel and
Hambrick (1992) suggest that marketing expertise on the TMT is critical to creation of
shareholder value. The appointment of a chief marketing officer (CMO) to the TMT is
one such way firms have attempted to address the needs of their environment to enhance
firm performance. Yet, an overarching limitation in the research literature stream
examining the importance of a CMO on the TMT is the scarcity of empirical research on
the value relevance of the presence of a CMO on firm performance. Addressing this gap
is important because of the long-standing debate on the financial relevance of the
marketing function (Frazier, 2007; Kerin, 2005; McGovern, Court, Quelch, & Crawford,
2004; Moorman & Rust, 1999; Webster, Malter, & Ganesan, 2003; Zinkhan &
Verbrugge, 2000). This is particularly true when the marketing function is represented on
the TMT (Abernathy, Kubick, & Masli, 2013; Boyd, Chandy, & Cunha, 2010; Nath &
57
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Mahajan, 2008, 2011; Kashmiri & Mahajan, 2010; Vafeas & Vlittis, 2009; Weinzimmer,
Bond, Houston, & Nystrom, 2003).
The decision to include a CMO on the TMT is complex (Nath & Mahajan, 2008).
This study provides insight into why prior empirical studies attempting to link the
presence of a CMO to firm performance have yielded mixed results. In doing so, this
study examines the moderating role of CMO presence on the relationship between firm
performance and firm visibility (H1), market power (H2), and industry orientation (H3)
through the lens of signaling theory.
Most prior research examining the relationship between a CMO’s presence on the
TMT and firm performance has adopted an intra-firm perspective examining the CMO’s
impact on internal firm processes. For example, Weinzimmer et al. (2003) suggest that
the inclusion of functional marketing expertise in the TMT, such as the CMO’s
capabilities, contributes to sales growth, firm profitability, and shareholder value. Boyd et
al., (2010) examine CMO managerial discretion in the firm. Nath and Mahajan (2008)
examine the relationship between CMO presence and firm-level innovation,
differentiation, branding strategy, and diversification. Kashmiri and Mahajan (2010)
examine the relationship between CMO presence and strategic behavior among familynamed firms. Nath and Mahajan (2011) examine CMO power in the TMT and domains
of control in the firm.
Two studies (i.e., Boyd et al. 2010; Vafeas & Vlittis, 2009) have examined the
impact of CMO appointment/announcement on firm performance, with
contextual/contingent results surrounding favorable changes in firm performance, using
announcement-induced stock market returns (event study methodology). In each study,
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the authors focus on the conditions that help explain variation in the shareholder reaction,
specifically firm-level conditions, such as managerial control, internal versus external
appointment, and individual-level characteristics (i.e., prior executive-level experience).
The authors suggest that the appointment or announcement itself does not improve firm
value but rather that the context of those appointments strongly influence perceived firm
performance. More specifically, Boyd et al. (2010) identify individual and firm-specific
conditions in which the CMO contributed more or less to firm performance. Similarly,
Abernathy et al. (2013) use performance attribution analysis to measure stock valuation
of firms with and without a CMO. They also found that enhanced firm value was
contextual.
Regardless of the approach, the relationship between a CMO’s presence on the
TMT and firm performance has yielded mixed results. For example, Boyd et al. (2010)
find only moderated effects on firm performance when examining the shareholder effect
of a CMO appointment using abnormal stock price movement of the appointing firm.
Nath and Mahajan (2011) report no direct effect of CMO presence on firm performance
but suggest conditional effects when CMO power is greater and when CMO
responsibility includes the firm’s sales function. Nath and Mahajan (2008) suggest no
direct effect when measuring CMO presence and firm performance. Kashmiri and
Mahajan (2010) also report no direct effect of CMO presence in their examination of firm
performance among family-named firms. Vafeas and Vlittis (2009) suggest that though
the market, on average, does not interpret the appointment of a CMO as a signal of
improving firm value, certain conditions surrounding their CMO appointment do. For
example, CMO experience and background can act as a signal resulting in enhanced firm
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value. Conversely, Abernathy et al., (2013) suggest there is a direct effect between CMO
presence and firm performance making the presence of a CMO on the TMT
“economically relevant.” They report that a portfolio of stocks with a CMO present yields
a greater annualized return (approximately 3%) compared to a stock portfolio of firms
without a CMO present on the TMT after adjusting for risk. In addition, they also suggest
that the effect of a CMO on the TMT is contextual upon firm strategic positioning,
profitability, innovation, and magnitude of advertising investment. Thus, unlike prior
research examining the direct relationship between CMO presence and firm performance,
the main contribution of this study is the examination of the moderating effect of CMO
presence on firm performance. Examining the moderating effect is important because
inconsistent findings from prior research could be due to a focus on CMO presence as a
direct effect rather than on how CMO presence moderates other relationships.
In this study, I use signaling theory to examine the signaling power of CMO
presence on firm performance. Signaling theory describes the process decision makers,
such as shareholders, use to resolve information asymmetry in competitive environments
(Spence, 1973, 1974). Firms intentionally convey information, often about intangible
qualities or important non-financial information, to external stakeholders to influence
their perceptions (Jones & Murrell, 2001) and manage stakeholder relationships
(Clarkson, 1995; Connelly, Certo, Ireland, & Reutzel, 2011; Freeman, 1984).
Appointment of a CMO has been viewed as a signal of increased emphasis on market
orientation, and potential improvements in business profitability (Kumar & Petersen,
2005; Lamberti & Noci, 2009; Narver & Slater, 1990).
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Using signaling theory, I theoretically and empirically examine the moderating
influence of the presence/absence of a CMO on the TMT on three firm-level factors—
firm visibility, firm market power, and firm industry orientation (differentiation)—known
to influence firm performance (Andras & Srinivasan, 2003; Chung & Jo, 1996; Farris &
Buzzell, 1979; Kashmiri & Mahajan, 2010; Kotabe, 1990; Mansfield, 1981; McGahan &
Porter, 1997). Thus, the contribution of my study expands the scope of inquiry to
examine moderating relationships that no other CMO study has specifically or
empirically explored. Furthermore, by examining the signaling power of CMO presence
among stakeholders in a non-event context, my study introduces alternative ways CMO
presence may contribute to firm performance, thus potentially making unique
contributions to the academic and practitioner dialogue on the role of a CMO on the TMT
as well as the manner in which firms can enhance firm performance.
In addition, the design of my study explores the operational definition differences
of a CMO used by Nath and Mahajan (2008) and Abernathy et al., (2013) and expands
the scope of inquiry. Namely, my study narrowly defines the variable of interest “CMO
presence” (i.e., someone who expressly holds the CMO title vs. anyone with the term
“marketing” in their title). In addition, my study uses a much broader sample, both in
breadth of industries and size/number of firms, not subject to the constraints of previous
research that allows for a better perspective of the impact of a CMO on the TMT and
their relationship to firm performance. Furthermore, instead of employing accountingbased measures or event-based changes in stock value to measure firm performance, I use
Tobin’s Q to measure firm performance because it is a market-based measure of firm
value that reflects information from signals (Xue, 2005).
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Literature Review and Research Hypotheses

Signaling Theory
Prior research suggests that perceptions of firm quality can be enhanced through
symbolic sources of information (Sanders & Boivie, 2004). Therefore, firms knowingly
use symbols (Rao, 1994) and attributes to signal firm quality (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983;
Sanders & Boivie, 2004). A signal can convey a socially constructed meaning beyond its
intrinsic content or obvious functional use (Morgan, Frost, & Pondy, 1983).
The act of using symbols and/or adopting formal structures, such as TMT
composition (Certo & Hodge, 2007; Zott & Huy, 2007), conveys a signal to the
marketplace about the quality, productivity, and viability of the firm. Firms undertake the
act of signaling to influence shareholders’ impressions (Rynes, 1991), which Certo
(2003) suggests garners greater shareholder interest and results in higher levels of firm
performance.
Information that conveys key attributes of the firm shape the impression
individuals form of a firm (Reyes, 1991). Signaling theory describes the process
individual decision makers use to resolve information asymmetry (Spence, 1973, 1974).
Information asymmetry is present when a firm knows its intrinsic quality but outsiders
(e.g., lenders, investors) do not (Connelly et al., 2011; Stiglitz, 2002). Firms with greater
information asymmetry have more incentive to signal (Xue, 2005). Information
asymmetry in various dimensions of the firm can result in unclear perceptions of the
firm’s capabilities (Jones & Murrell, 2001). Reducing information asymmetry minimizes
both adverse selection and moral hazard (Nayyar, 1990; Stiglitz, 1985).
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Higgins and Gulati (2006) suggest that the composition of the TMT can have a
symbolic meaning beyond the functional nature of the TMT position. Certo (2003)
suggests that the board of directors and board structure assume symbolic roles that are
independent of the board’s tangible or functional activities; that is, each role can act as a
symbol, signaling important non-financial information to investors when making
purchase decisions about shares of initial public offerings.
For these reasons, signaling theory focuses on the actions or attributes insiders
intentionally use to communicate positive but otherwise imperceptible qualities
(Connelly et al., 2011) about a firm’s products (Kirmani & Rao, 2000) or the firm itself
(Ross, 1977). Firms signal to shape the impressions people form about the quality,
productivity, and viability of the firm (Rynes, 1991) because impressions lead to
investment decisions (Certo, 2003; Certo, Covin, Daily, & Dalton, 2001; Lester, Certo,
Dalton, Dalton, & Cannella, 2006). Connelly et al. (2011) define firm quality as the
underlying, unobservable ability of the signaler (firm) to fulfill the needs and demands of
an outsider (stockholder) observing the signal.
TMT characteristics used to convey firm quality include prestige of TMT
members and their educational background (Lester et al., 2006), TMT heterogeneity
(Zimmerman, 2008), TMT functional background (Hitt & Tyler, 1991), TMT experience
(Cohen & Dean, 2005), and TMT composition (Higgins & Gulati, 2006). Levy and
Lazarovich-Porat (1995) suggest that investors are willing to pay a higher price for a firm
that signals its quality, ceteris paribus. The question I address here is: does CMO
presence/absence on the TMT send a signal about firm quality that affects firm
performance?
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CMO Presence and Firm Performance
From prior results, is it reasonable to predict that the presence/absence of a CMO
on the TMT will directly affect firm performance? On the one hand, empirical research
(i.e., Nath & Mahajan, 2008, 2011) specifically examining the direct effect of CMO
presence on firm performance suggests that there is no direct effect. On the other hand,
Abernathy et al., (2013) and Weinzimmer et al. (2003) suggest that firm performance is
directly related to marketing’s inclusion on the TMT.
Kashmiri and Mahajan (2010) and Nath and Mahajan (2008, 2011) report no
significant relationship in their empirical examinations of the impact of CMOs on firm
performance. When examining strategic behavior and firm performance among familynamed firms, Kashmiri and Mahajan (2010) determine that the presence of a CMO on the
TMT has no direct effect on firm performance. Nath and Mahajan (2008) find that CMO
presence on the TMT has neither a direct positive nor a negative impact on firm
performance despite other researchers finding a positive association between CMO
presence and firm-level innovativeness (Klomp & Van Leeuwen, 2001), differentiation
(Kale & Arditi, 2003), branding strategy (Morgan & Rego, 2009; Rumelt, 1982), and
diversification (Varadarajan & Ramanujam, 1987), all firm traits previously associated
with firm performance.
Possible limitations in Nath and Mahajan’s (2008) study, however, may have led
to inconclusive results. Limitations that may have reduced the statistical power of the
analysis include the operational definition of a CMO (anyone with the term ”marketing”
in their title), an artificial constraint of the data sample (included only firms with sales
greater than $250 million), restriction of the study to industries that were not sufficiently
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diverse (heavily skewed toward undifferentiated industries, such as large equipment
manufacturing, and raw materials), and use of small sample size among the selected
industries (50% of selected industries had fewer than seven observations each). In
subsequent research focusing on CMO power in TMTs, Nath and Mahajan (2011) again
find no direct relationship to firm performance but suggest that CMO presence can
enhance firm performance under certain conditions. These conditions include when
TMTs have a relatively high proportion of divisional heads, in which centralized efforts
would yield greater performance, or when CMOs have additional responsibility for the
sales function.
A different perspective is that the presence of a CMO on the TMT is perceived as
a signal of the corporate adoption and corporate status of the marketing concept (Piercy,
1986; Webster, 1981; Webster et al., 2003). Weinzimmer et al. (2003) empirically find
that the inclusion of marketing expertise, as measured by the presence of a marketing
executive (not necessarily a CMO) on the TMT, uniquely contributes to three key
financial outcomes: sales growth, firm profitability, and shareholder wealth.
Appointment of a CMO to the TMT is viewed as signaling a potential
improvement in firm profitability (Kumar & Peterson, 2005; Narver & Slater, 1990).
Although empirical research suggests that a CMO announcement is met in financial
markets with positive results, this effect occurs only in the presence of moderating
variables (Boyd et al., 2010; Vafeas & Vlittis, 2009). For example, Boyd et al. (2010)
empirically find that the impact of a CMO announcement on firm value (stock price) is
highly contingent on the managerial discretion afforded CMOs; when customer power is
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low (absence of a major customer), perceived managerial discretion is high and linked to
higher stock values.
Using signaling theory, Vafeas and Vlittis (2009) find that a favorable change in
share price occurs for firms after a CMO announcement but is contingent on the profile
of the appointee and the financial situation of the appointing firm rather than the
announcement event itself. They observe abnormal stock returns when (1) the newly
appointed CMO had prior marketing executive experience, (2) the CMO provided
information on the firm’s future marketing strategy, and (3) the firm experienced poor
stock price performance in the year before the appointment. Vafeas and Vlittis (2009)
also find that financial markets view the appointment of a CMO unfavorably in highly
differentiated industries, such as high-technology firms, because such an appointment is
perceived as a negative signal about the present quality and future innovativeness of the
firm’s product line.
Thus, when present, the CMO position on the TMT has a moderating effect on
firm-level outcomes, such as firm performance, and in accordance with signaling theory,
the CMO position serves as a symbolic role as well as a functional role on the TMT. This
conclusion is supported by prior research that suggests that the presence of a CMO on the
TMT helps reduce information asymmetry (Brammer & Millington, 2006) by signaling
important non-financial information, such as the presence of intangible assets or rare
capabilities in the firm, to firm outsiders. In turn, this action reduces information
asymmetry and influences the decisions of stockholders and investors (Connelly et al.,
2011) because investors are able to more accurately distinguish between high- and lowquality firms (Connelly et al., 2011; Elitzur & Gavious, 2003; Stiglitz, 2000). Therefore,

67

rather than considering whether CMOs have a direct influence on firm performance,
which has yielded mixed results in previous research, I propose that an indirect or
moderating relationship exists between the presence/absence of a CMO on the TMT on
three firm-level factors—firm visibility, firm market power, and firm industry orientation
(differentiation)—and firm performance. The model in Figure 3 shows the relationships
to be tested.

Figure 3
Model of Moderating Relationships

CMO Presence, Firm Visibility, and Firm Performance
Firm visibility reflects the extent to which analysts follow and institutions hold a
firm’s stock (Baker, Powell, & Weaver, 1999). Firm visibility is important to firms for at
least two financial reasons: (1) it helps reduce the risk associated with information
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asymmetry (Barry & Brown, 1986) and (2) it provides expert validation of a firm’s
present worth and growth potential (Ikeler, 2007). Extant research has used firm visibility
as a proxy for the quality of a firm’s informational environment (Lang, Lins, & Miller,
2003).
Merton (1987) suggests that visibility of a firm and its stock lowers cost of capital
resulting in an increase in the market value of the firm’s shares. Using Merton’s model,
Baker, Nofsinger, and Weaver (2002) report empirical data that support Merton’s
assertion that firm visibility reduces the cost of capital. Trueman (1996) finds a positive
relationship between firm visibility and stock price. McConnell and Serveaes (1990)
report a positive direct effect between greater visibility, as measured by the degree of
shareholding of institutions and large block owners, and firm performance. Likewise,
Kadlec and McConnell (1994) empirically demonstrate the relationship between firm
visibility and market-based firm performance, as measured by abnormal increases in
stock price. As such, the inclusion of institutional investors in this study is important
because prior research reports that “relative to individual investors, the sophistication of
institutional investors enables them to more effectively monitor managerial behavior”
(Higgins & Gulati, 2006, p. 6).
Firms can increase visibility in several ways. One way is through the development
of social capital. Social capital is an intangible, market-based asset capable of creating a
competitive advantage (Bamford, Bruton, & Hinson, 2006). Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998,
p. 243) define social capital as “the sum of actual and potential resources embedded with,
available through, and derived from the network of relationship possessed by an
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individual or social unit.” Gargiulo and Rus (2002) suggest that the social network of a
chief executive officer (CEO) is a good indicator of firm visibility.
Likewise, it is anticipated that the social capital of a CMO on the TMT
simultaneously improves the informational environment and enhances firm visibility
because external interactions of the TMT inherently create visibility while contributing
information (Geletkanycz & Hambrick, 1997). Social capital can be obtained by a CMO
through relationships with distributors, retailers, customers, and even government
agencies (Griffith & Harvey, 2004; Srivastava, Shervani, & Fahey, 1998). Social capital
of a newly hired CMO can also provide opportunities that otherwise may not have been
available to the firm (Boyd et al., 2010; Griffith & Harvey, 2004). In addition, a CMO
can acquire social capital by virtue of membership in social networks and global online
resource groups (Porter, 1998), such as the CMO Council, the CMO Institute, and
CMOsite.com, to name just a few.
Thus, in accordance with signaling theory (Spence, 1973, 1974), I propose that
firms with a CMO on the TMT are better positioned to facilitate the relationship between
firm visibility and firm performance than those without a CMO. This is anticipated
because the CMO position signals the presence of intangible assets, such as social capital
in the firm (Court, 2007; Nath & Mahajan, 2008). In this way, CMO presence on the
TMT helps reduce the degree of information asymmetry between TMT executives and
stakeholders (Brammer & Millington, 2006) while amplifying firm visibility. For these
reasons, I hypothesize the following:
H1: The relationship between firm visibility and firm performance is moderated by
the presence/absence of a CMO on the TMT such that when a CMO is present the
relationship is stronger, but when a CMO is absent, the relationship is weaker.
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CMO Presence, Market Power, and Firm Performance
To achieve a competitive advantage in the marketplace, firms selectively choose
their markets and strategically deploy valued resources (Kerin, Mahajan, & Varadarajan,
1990). A primary way firms achieve a sustainable competitive advantage is through
differentiation (Porter, 1980). Prior research indicates that market power is related to a
firm’s ability to differentiate (Hay, 2008; Nevo, 1999; Porter, 1998).
Market power is in part determined by the degree of advertising intensity and
R&D intensity of a firm (Andras & Srinivasan, 2003; Bain, 1956). The relationship
among advertising intensity, profit margin, and firm performance has been empirically
supported (Abernathy et al., 2013: Andras & Srinivasan, 2003; Farris & Buzzell, 1979),
as has the relationship among R&D intensity, profit margins, and firm performance
(Abernathy et al., 2013; Andras & Srinivasan, 2003; Kotabe, 1990; Mansfield, 1981).
Market power enables the firm to better leverage assets, enhance legitimacy, and obtain
resources of higher quality (Baum & Oliver, 1991).
CMO presence on the TMT can facilitate the relationship between market power
and firm performance in three ways. First, the CMO, by virtue of experience and
educational background, helps the firm make better marketing decisions that improve
firm performance (Pasa & Shugan, 1996), especially in industries with greater
competition (Kohli & Jaworski, 1990). Second, the value of firm-level resources, such as
market power, is amplified through expert interpretation (Pasa & Shugan, 1996). Within
the firm-level context, an organization’s functional expertise also confers greater power
to the CMO to moderate firm performance in situations that provide managerial
discretion (Boyd et al., 2010). This leads to the following hypothesis:
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H2: The relationship between market power and firm performance is moderated
by the presence/absence of a CMO on the TMT such that when a CMO is present
the relationship is stronger, but when a CMO is absent, the relationship is
weaker.

CMO Presence, Industry Orientation, and Firm Performance
Hull and Rothenberg (2008) suggest industry orientation, or the differentiation
within an industry, positively affects firm performance. Companies that differentiate
themselves achieve above-average returns (Porter, 1980, 1996; Selling & Stickney,
1989). Some industries, however, lend themselves to higher levels of differentiation than
others, and there is evidence that industry-level factors, such as overall levels of
differentiation, also affect performance (McGahan & Porter, 1997). Pasa and Shugan
(1996) suggest that marketing capabilities lead to decisions that improve firm
performance, especially in industries with greater competition (Kohli & Jaworski, 1990).
Thus, it is anticipated that CMO presence moderates the relationship between
industry orientation (differentiation) and firm performance for three reasons. First,
marketing activities are a principal instrument for addressing the uncertainty inherent in
differentiated industries and the CMO is best positioned to reduce the uncertainty.
Second, differentiated industries place greater value on experimentation and new
strategies, which are activities that fall within the domain of the CMO. Third,
differentiated industries provide a broad range of behavior options that afford the CMO
greater managerial discretion to leverage firm resources.
Differentiated industries create environmental uncertainty because of the inherent
characteristic of heterogeneity (Milliken, 1987). TMTs facing a differentiated
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environment have greater information processing needs than management executives in
more stable industries (Dess & Beard, 1984). Khandwalla (1977) suggests that marketing
activities are a principal instrument for addressing the uncertainty inherent in uncertain
environments. Uncertainty related to new product or new market entries also requires the
attention of functional experts, such as a CMO, because they approach potential problems
with more understanding and frame problems more comprehensively (Read, Dew,
Sarasvathy, Song, & Wiltbank, 2009). Nath and Mahajan (2011) suggest that compared
with other TMT members, the CMO is best positioned to reduce TMT uncertainty given
the customer-related human, institutional, relational, and organizational resources they
control.
Differentiated industries also place greater value on experimentation and new
strategies because of the broad managerial latitude of available strategic choices (Datta,
Rajagopalan, & Zhang, 2003). Knowledge gained through experimentation and firsthand
experience is difficult to replicate and cannot be explicitly expressed or taught; as such, it
is an intangible firm asset (Barney, 1991; Vafeas & Vlittis, 2009) and a source for
competitive advantage (Capron & Hulland, 1999). Firsthand experience also affects how
managers approach and arrive at decisions (Vafeas & Vlittis, 2009). Thus, the ability to
pursue experimentation is considered a valuable cognitive trait in top executives (Datta &
Rajagopolan, 1998) and one that falls within the domain of the CMO (Aaker &
Joachimsthaler, 2000).
Signaling theory also supports the notion that the presence of a CMO on the TMT
reduces information asymmetry because the position provides a basis for outsiders to
make an inference about the firm’s unobservable capabilities, including those of the
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CMO (Vafeas & Vlittis, 2009). These capabilities include marketing expertise
(Weinzimmer et al., 2003), market sensing (Day, 1994), and managerial discretion (Boyd
et al., 2010), all of which are important when attempting to enhance firm differentiation.
Thus, it is anticipated that CMO presence on the TMT facilitates the relationship
between differentiated industries and firm performance for two reasons. First, CMO
presence on the TMT enhances the degree of firm differentiation so the firm will be more
competitive. Second, the presence of a CMO on the TMT signals information about the
firm to both investors and competitors, including firm strength, quality, and resource
availability (Vafeas & Vlittis, 2009). Consequently, the presence of a CMO on the TMT
should amplify the relationship between differentiated industries and firm performance,
more so than firms participating in other, non-differentiated environments (Kohl &
Jaworski, 1990; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967).
I posit that firms in differentiated industries with a CMO on the TMT are better
positioned to enhance firm differentiation than those without because differentiated
industries provide a broad range of behavior options (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1993).
Differentiated industries also afford the CMO greater managerial discretion to leverage
firm resources (Datta et al., 2003; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1988). Thus, I hypothesize
the following:
H3: The relationship between industry orientation (differentiated industries) and firm
performance is moderated by the presence/absence of a CMO on the TMT such that
when a CMO is present, the relationship is stronger, but when absent, the
relationship is weaker.
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METHODOLOGY
Design
Hierarchical regression was used to examine the moderating influence of CMO
presence on the relationship between firm visibility, market power, and industry
orientation and firm performance. Hierarchical regression was chosen because it is
robust, measures both the relationship and the overall strength of the relationship between
two variables (Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2010), and has been used to test the
relationships between organizational structures and environmental factors (e.g., Aldrich
& Pfeffer, 1976; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).
For this sample, calendar years 2010 and 2011 were selected because this period
provides a current reflection of TMT structure among U.S. firms and avoids the 2007–
2009 economic crises, noted by Business Wire, a global leader in financial and business
news, as the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s.

Data Sources
H1, H2, and H3 were tested using secondary data drawn from Capital IQ.
Additional or missing data were obtained from annual reports, 10K reports, and other
public sources, including Morningstar.com. This data included TMT size and verification
of the presence or absence of a CMO on the TMT during the periods examined. The use
of secondary data, public databases, and business press to acquire information on publicly
traded firms is consistent with prior examinations of CMO presence and firm
performance (Abernathy et al., 2013; Boyd et al., 2010; Kashmiri & Mahajan, 2010; Nath
& Mahajan, 2008). Furthermore, use of secondary data is advantageous because it
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reduces the likelihood of bias and enhances the generalizability of the research findings.
This occurs because the population size from which to draw the sample tends to be
larger; thus, the sample itself tends to be larger and more representative of the population
than primary data-gathering techniques (Sorensen, Sabroe, & Olsen, 1996). Consistent
with other studies (McGahan & Porter, 1997) using secondary data sources, this analysis
excluded private firms because key variables of interest do not exist or are not reported
by private firms.

Sample and Sample Size
This initial data set consisted of a sample of 1,189 firms across 10 different
industry groups randomly selected from more than 11,017 public U.S. firms one year or
older available in the Capital IQ database. This study expands the scope of Nath and
Mahajan’s (2008) examination of CMO influence on firm performance using two-digit
Standard Industrial Classification codes. One of the advantages of this study is that it uses
the two-digit Global Industry Classification System (GICS). Prior research has shown
that GICS codes enhance explanatory power, have a greater correlation across industry
peer firms than the Fama–French classification system, and are more parsimonious
(Chan, Lakonishok, & Swaminathan, 2007). Prior research also suggests that GICS is
significantly better at explaining stock return co-movements, cross-sectional variations in
valuation multiples, forecasted and realized growth rates, R&D expenditures, and other
key financial ratios important to external investors across different-sized firms than other
classification schemes (Bhojraj, Lee, & Oler, 2003).
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In addition to an enhanced classification schema, other advantages of this sample
include the diversity and number of observations per industry. At the two digit level, the
composition of the total sample was as follows: 20 firms in Energy (GICS 10), 65 in
Materials (GICS 15), 169 in Industrials (GICS 20), 293 in Consumer Discretionary
(GICS 25), 62 in Consumer Staples (GICS 30), 247 in Health Care (GICS 35), 32 in
Financials (GICS 40), 272 in Information Technology (GICS 45), 23 in
Telecommunication Services (GICS 50), and 6 in Utilities (GICS 55). At the six digit
level, 55 industries are represented. Finally, statistical power is gained from the large
sample, which drew from all U.S. publicly traded firms, regardless of sales volume. In
doing so, the data set was not artificially constrained and did not ignore small or newly
established firms. In the past, research has limited sample composition to firms reporting
total sales revenue of at least $250 million (Hambrick & Cannella, 2004; Nath &
Mahajan, 2008).
Seventy seven observations were deemed to contain missing data and were
discarded. The outlier labeling rule (Hoaglin & Iglewicz, 1987) helped identify data
outliers within each continuous variable, and 54 were discarded, resulting in a total
sample size of 1,058. The sample size provided more than the five observations per
independent metric variable required for hierarchical multiple regression (Hair et al.,
2010). A Mahalanobis D2 analysis was conducted to identify multivariate outliers across
all independent metric variables. No observations met or exceeded the threshold of .001
or less (Hair et al., 2010, p. 66). The resulting sample included 239 observations with and
819 observations without a titled CMO present on the TMT. The proportion of firms in
the sample with a titled CMO on the TMT was 22.6%, slightly higher than the average of
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19.6% reported by Nash and Mahajan (2008). Table 1 illustrates the range of CMO
presence on the TMT by industry. Five industries (Consumer Discretionary, Consumer
Staples, Financial, Information Technology, and Telecom) were over-indexed, while five
industries (Energy, Materials, Industrials, Health Care, and Utilities) were under-indexed
relative to the presence of a CMO on the TMT.

Table 3
CMO Presence by Industry
100%
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CMO Abscence
CMO Presence

Dependent Variable
The dependent variable of interest is firm performance as measured by Tobin’s Q.
Tobin’s Q refers to market capitalization plus the value of the firm’s preferred stock plus
debt divided by total assets (Rao, Agarwal, & Dahlhoff, 2004). This market-based
measure has been used extensively in prior financial and marketing literature (Lehmann,
2004; Nath & Mahajan, 2008; Rust, Ambler, Carpenter, Kumar, & Srivastava, 2004;
Wernerfelt & Montgomery, 1988). Tobin’s Q is a measure that reflects the value of the
firm as perceived by its shareholders (Nath & Mahajan, 2008) and captures the degree to
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which the market values a firm relative to its replacement cost (Mehran, 2004). Many
researchers prefer Tobin’s Q as a measure of firm performance because it is forward
looking, is not susceptible to external influences (e.g., industry-specific accounting
standards; Anderson, Fornell, & Mazvancheryl, 2004), and, of most relevance to this
study, incorporates information from signals in a firm’s valuation (Xue, 2005).

Explanatory Variables
Three independent contextual firm-level variables were examined: firm visibility,
market power, and industry orientation. In addition, one moderating variable, CMO
presence, was examined across all three hypotheses.

Firm Visibility
The construct of firm visibility consisted of two measures: the number of
institutional shares outstanding and the number of institutional shareholders (Ackert &
Athanassakos, 2001; Baker et al., 1999; Barron, Byard, Kile, & Riedl, 2002). Both
measures are widely used proxies for firm visibility and were obtained through the
Capitol IQ database. Thus, the construct of firm visibility was measured as the sum of the
geometric mean of the reported number of institutional shares outstanding (NOI) and the
number of institutional shareholders (NOS) reported at the close of each calendar year
observed. Use of the geometric mean serves to normalize the ranges of two types of
variables being analyzed, avoids the issue that one range or variable dominates the
weighting, and accounts for the compounding effect (Spizman & Weinstein, 2008).
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Market Power
The construct of market power was operationalized with two measures in
accordance with prior literature (Nath & Mahajan, 2008; Slotegraaf & Atuahene-Gima,
2011): advertising intensity and research intensity. Advertising intensity was measured
by annual advertising expenditures divided by annual sales revenue (Nath & Mahajan,
2008; Willis & Rogers, 1998; Zhang, Zhu, Yue, & Zhu, 2010). Research intensity was
measured by annual R&D expenses divided by annual sales (Nath & Mahajan, 2008;
Slotegraaf & Atuahene-Gima, 2011). Research intensity affects systematic risk of the
firm and analyst recommendations (Barth, Kasznik, & McNichols, 2001; McAlister,
Srinivasan, & Kim, 2007). Because the nature of H2 also examines a theoretical
construct, market power, it was measured as the sum of the geometric mean of annual
advertising expenditures of the firm divided by annual sales revenue (AI) and the annual
R&D expenses of the firm divided by annual sales (RI), reported at the close of each
calendar year observed.

Industry Orientation
Industry orientation typically classifies industries as either “differentiated” or
“non-differentiated,” but degrees of differentiation actually exist. In line with prior
research (Grönroos, 1983), differentiated industries refer to industries that provide a
variety of product or service offerings to meet the needs and wants of a heterogeneous
population of customers. Differentiated industries are of interest because firms operating
in differentiated industries are afforded a broad range of strategic options (Haleblian &
Finkelstein, 1993) and TMTs greater managerial discretion (Datta et al., 2003;
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Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1988). Consistent with Hull and Rothenberg (2008)
differentiated industries are measured using a multi-year average of the advertising
intensity in each firm’s industry. Industries with higher advertising intensity are deemed
to be highly differentiated industries while those with lower advertising intensity are
deemed to be industries with low differentiation. Industry characteristics were ascertained
by means of the six-digit industry code representing each firm’s dominant line of
business, as determined by GICS. The degree of differentiation was measured by the
geometric mean of two years of advertising intensity by industry then standardized using
Z-score transformation to reflect the degree of differentiation among industries in the
sample.

CMO Presence
Finally, the moderating condition of CMO presence/absence was determined
through the use of title classifications that expressly state “chief marketing officer,” in
keeping with prior research (Boyd et al., 2010). Examination of this characteristic as a
moderating variable is supported by prior research (Abernathy et al., 2013; Boyd et al.
2010; Michel & Hambrick, 1992; Vafeas & Vlittis, 2009; Weinzimmer et al., 2003). The
moderating variable in question—CMO presence/absence—is a categorical moderator
that is non-metric in nature. For the purpose of this study, CMO presence on the TMT
was coded as 1, CMO absence was coded as 0.
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Control Variables
In accordance with prior research on TMTs and firm performance (Collins &
Clark, 2003; Eaton & Rosen, 1983; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996; Michel & Hambrick,
1992; Nath & Mahajan, 2008), three control variables were used: firm size, firm age, and
TMT size. In addition, dummy variables were created and used as control variables for
each industry. First, controlling for firm size addresses the likelihood that large firms
have more resource advantages than small firms (Collins & Clark, 2003). Firm size was
measured by the total number of employees (Boyd et al., 2010; Covin, Green, & Slevin,
2006; Nath & Mahajan, 2008; Newbert, 2007).
Second, prior research commonly recognizes firm age as influencing firm
performance (Anderson & Reeb, 2004; Miller & Chen, 1996; O’Sullivan & Abela, 2007).
Firm age was determined by the number of years a firm has been in business (Anderson
& Reeb, 2004; Marimuthu & Kolandaisamy, 2009; O’Sullivan & Abela, 2007).
Third, prior research has shown that TMT size affects firm performance (Certo,
Lester, Dalton, & Dalton, 2006; Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1993). Controlling for TMT
size addresses the belief that TMT size determines the scope of the TMT’s informationprocessing and decision-making capabilities (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1993) and is in
accordance with Carpenter, Geletkanycz, and Sanders’s (2004) call to control for team
size when examining the effects of the TMT on firm outcomes. Including TMT size as a
control also addresses the tendency of large firms to have a CMO on the TMT (Nath &
Mahajan, 2008). In accordance with prior research (Carpenter et al., 2004; Walsh, 1989),
TMT size was determined by examining each firm’s 10-K or annual report and counting
the number of corporate officers listed.
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Finally, controlling for industry membership addresses the effects of industrylevel variables on firm performance. These effects include profitability (Beard & Dess,
1981), growth (Porter, 1980; Russo & Fouts, 1997), and volatility (Kotha & Swamidass,
2000). Controlling for industry membership also addresses the likelihood that some
industries provide greater firm visibility (Solomon, 2012) and market power (Comanor &
Wilson, 1967). For the purpose of this study, industry membership was coded as 1 and
non-membership as 0.

Analysis
Because H1, H2, and H3 examine the moderating relationship between internal
and firm-level contextual variables and a single dependent interval scale variable,
hierarchical moderated regression was used. Prior research has deemed this manner of
analysis appropriate (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003; Hair et al., 2010; Matta &
Beamish, 2008; Press & Wilson, 1978). This direction of analysis follows Cohen and
Cohen’s (1983) suggestion to use moderating variables to identify and better understand
the conditions under which hypotheses and theory hold. To express the direction of the
relationship, one-tailed tests were used in each hypothesis (Hair et al., 2010). Skewness
and kurtosis levels of the dependent and independent variables firm visibility and market
power were logarithmically transformed to address positive skewness before analysis.
Table 4 provides descriptive statistics of the final sample.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

Minimum
Maximum
Mean
s.d.
0.0700
9.4900
2.5400
1.7200
5.0000 440885.0000 14380.6191 47605.9909
2.0000
192.0000
43.0359
35.8076
4.0000
19.0000
9.5000
2.5890
323.0000 3508318.0000 161580.0974 336367.5474
1.8000
430.8400
11.7370
21.2612
0.0000
0.0036
0.0007
0.0007
0.0000
1.0000
0.2300
0.4180
-1.5889
1.7427
0.1226
0.3422
-0.6140
0.5740
-0.0021
0.0700
0.0000
0.0036
0.0002
0.0052
.003
-.156**
-.025
.144**
.124**
-.041
.069*
.020
.032
-.098**

1

.301**
.359**
.422**
-.069*
.118**
.299**
.538**
-.111**
.155**

2

.327**
.262**
-.170**
.081**
.086**
.207**
-.005
.197**

3

n = 1,058
CMO Presence: 1= Present, 0= Absent.
Geometric mean and standard deviation for variables 5, 6, and 7 are reported in Table 2.
To minimize positive skewness and multicollinearity, variables 1, 5, and 6 were logarithmically transformed prior to analysis.
To reflect relative degrees of differentiation within industry orientation, variable 7 was converted to a Z-score prior to analysis.
Firm market power less industry median ratios.
*=.05,**=.01, significant correlation using one tailed test.

Variables
Tobin's Q
Firm size
Firm Age
TMT Size
Firm Visibility
Firm Market Power
Industry Orientation
CMO Presence
CMO x Firm Visibility
CMO x Firm Market Power
CMO x Industry Orientation

Table 4
Paper 2 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations

.583**
-.060*
.172**
.256**
.383**
-.064*
.167**

4

6

-.077*
.089**
.093**
.408** -.021
.539*
-.037
-.062
.288**
.114*** .037

5

.120**
.132**
.072*
.560**

7

9

.663**
-.056
-.119**
.166** .206**

8

.132**

10
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Before the hierarchical moderated regression was run, bivariate correlations were
examined. Except for the correlation between the moderating variable CMO presence (r =
.663) and the interaction term CMO x Firm Visibility, no other correlations approached
the .70 threshold suggested in prior research (Dorman et al., 2013; Hair et al., 2010).
Because H1 and H2 contain a construct within each hypothesis, a geometric mean
using two variables were created. For H1, the geometric mean of institutional shares and
institutional shareholders was created to measure the reflective construct of firm visibility
(Ackert & Athanassakos, 2001; Baker et al., 1999; Barron, et al., 2002). For H2, the
geometric mean of advertising intensity and R&D intensity was created to measure the
formative construct of market power (Nath & Mahajan, 2008; Slotegraaf & AtuaheneGima, 2011).
To test H1, H2, and H3 (examining the moderating effects of CMO presence on
the relationship between firm visibility, market power, and industry orientation and firm
performance) an interaction variable was created for each. For H1, the interaction
variable was calculated by multiplying CMO presence and firm visibility (the geometric
mean of institutional shares and institutional shareholders). For H2, the interaction
variable was calculated by multiplying CMO presence and firm market power (the
geometric mean of advertising intensity and R&D intensity). For H3, the interaction
variable was calculated by multiplying CMO presence and industry orientation (the
standardized Z-score of industry advertising intensity). In line with prior literature
(Afshartous & Preston, 2011; Aiken & West, 1991; Dawson, 2014; Marquardt, 1980),
continuous variables (e.g. control variables) were mean centered before analysis to
increase the interpretability of regression coefficients. Excluding the binary moderating
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variable, variables of interest were also mean centered before the calculation of
interaction terms and subsequent regression analysis (Cohen, et al., 2003, Dawson, 2014).
Table 5 contains the hierarchical regression results used to test the hypothesized
moderating relationships of CMO presence/absence on firm visibility (Model 1C), market
power (Model 1D), and industry orientation (Model 1E) on firm performance. Variance
inflation factor scores reported in the results were compared with the suggested cutoff
threshold of 10 (Hair et al., 2010). All scores were below the suggested threshold.

Table 5
Moderating Effect of CMO Presence on Firm Performance
Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analysis
Variables
Step 1: Constant

Model 1A
B
(SE)
1.097*** (.170)

Model 1B
B
(SE)
1.101*** (.167)

Model 1C
B
(SE)
1.105*** (.166)

Model 1D
B
(SE)
1.103*** (.167)

Model 1E
B
(SE)
1.119*** (.166)

Step 2: Control Variables
Firm Size
Firm Age
TMT Size
Ind - Energy
Ind - Materials
Ind - Industrials
Ind - Consumer Discretionary
Ind - Consumer Staples
Ind - Healthcare
Ind - Financials
Ind - IT
Ind - Telecomm

.000
-.001***
.003
.113
.076
-.059
-.016
.076
.242
-.164
.131
-.118

.000
-.001***
-.018**
.070
.056
-.072
-.021
.122
.226
-.098
.090
-.123

(.000)
(.000)
(.006)
(.189)
(.173)
(.169)
(.169)
(.180)
(.169)
(.189)
(.169)
(.199)

.000
-.001***
-.018**
.067
.057
-.071
-.023
.131
.230
-.092
.090
-.124

(.000)
(.000)
(.006)
(.189)
(.173)
(.169)
(.169)
(.180)
(.169)
(.188)
(.168)
(.189)

.000
-.001***
-.018**
.071
.055
-.073
-.024
.115
.229
-.094
.088
-.126

(.000)
(.000)
(.006)
(.190)
(.173)
(.169)
(.169)
(.181)
(.169)
(.189)
(.169)
(.189)

.000
-.001**
-.018**
.061
.041
-.085
-.041
.105
.210
-.113
.073
-.128

.148***
.152**
-.015
.042

(.024)
(.054)
(.015)
(.035)

.163***
.153**
-.015
.101*

(.024)
(.054)
(.015)
(.042)

.148***
.135*
-.016
.044

(.024)
(.057)
(.015)
(.035)

-.148**

(.058)

Step 3: Main Effects
Firm Visibility
Market Power
Industry Orientation
CMO Presence

(.000)
(.000)
(.006)
(.194)
(.177)
(.173)
(.171)
(.180)
(.172)
(.189)
(.172)
(.190)

Step 4: Moderated Variables
CMO Presence X Firm Visibility
CMO Presence X Market Power
CMO Presence X Industry Orientation
Overall Model R²
Adjusted R²
Change in R²

.092***
.081
.092

.187

.147***
.152**
.005
.050

n = 1,058
CMO Presence: 1= Present, 0= Absent.
Dependant variable: Tobin's Q.
Change in R² reported for Model 1C, 1D and 1E over Model 1B.
Unstandardized coefficients and standard error reported.
*=.05,**=.01, ***=.001 One-tailed test.

.143**
.129
.005

.139
.125
.001

(.024)
(.054)
(.018)
(.035)

(.191)
-.065*

.138***
.125
.046

(.000)
(.000)
(.006)
(.189)
(.173)
(.169)
(.169)
(.180)
(.169)
(.189)
(.169)
(.189)

.142*
.128
.005

(.028)
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The first part in the hierarchical regression (Model 1A) included only the control
variables. The overall control model is statistically significant (R2 = .092, p = .000).
Among the control variables, only firm age (β = -.001, p = .001) was significant.
The second part of the hierarchical regression (Model 1B) measured the direct
effects of the independent variables. The addition to the model of firm visibility, market
power, industry orientation, and CMO presence was statistically significant (R2 = .138, p
= .000) and represented a significant change in R2 over the inclusion of the control
variables alone (change in R2 = .046, p = .000). Regarding the direct effect of the
independent variables on firm performance, firm visibility was positive and statistically
significant (β = .148, p = .000), and market power was positive and statistically
significant (β = .152, p = .005). However, industry orientation (β = -.015, p = .325) and
CMO presence (β = .042, p = .225) were non-significant.
The third part of the hierarchical regression (Model 1C) measured the interaction
effect of CMO presence on firm visibility and firm performance. The addition of the
moderating variable was negative but statistically significant (β = -.148, p = .010) and
represented a small change in R2 over the main effects Model 1B (change in R2 = .005, p
= .010).
The fourth part of the hierarchical regression (Model 1D) measured the
interaction effect of CMO presence on market power and firm performance. The addition
of the moderating variable was not statistically significant (β = .187, p = .326) and
represented no meaningful change in R2 (change in R2 = .001, p = .326) over the main
effects Model 1B. The fifth part of the hierarchical regression (Model 1E) measured the
interaction effect of CMO presence on industry orientation and firm performance. The
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addition of the moderating variable was statistically significant but negative (β = -.065, p
= .019) and represented a small change in R2 over the main effects Model 1B (change in
R2 = .005 p = .019).
For H1, the regression coefficients show that the interaction of CMO presence
with firm visibility was significant but negative (β = –.148, p = .010). Thus, this finding
does not support H1: The presence/absence of a CMO on the TMT moderates the
relationship between firm visibility and firm performance such that when a CMO is
present, the relationship is stronger, but when a CMO is absent, the relationship is
weaker.

Figure 4
Interaction between CMO Presence and Firm Visibility on Firm Performance
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Figure 4 illustrates the interaction effect of firm visibility and firm performance
when a CMO is present or absent on the TMT. In situations where firm visibility is low,
the presence of a CMO enhances the relationship between firm visibility and firm
performance. However, when firm visibility is high, they do not.
For H2, the regression coefficients show that the interaction of CMO presence
with market power was non-significant (β = .187, p = .326). Thus, this finding does not
support H2: The presence/absence of a CMO on the TMT moderates the relationship
between market power and firm performance, such that when a CMO is present, the
relationship is stronger, but when a CMO is absent, the relationship is weaker.
For H3, the regression coefficients show that the interaction of CMO presence
with industry orientation is significant but negative (β = –.065, p = .019). Thus, this
finding does not support H3: The presence/absence of a CMO on the TMT moderates the
relationship between industry orientation (differentiated industries) and firm
performance, such that in differentiated industries when a CMO is present, the
relationship is stronger, but when a CMO is absent, the relationship is weaker.
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Figure 5
Interaction between CMO Presence and Industry Orientation on Firm Performance

2

Firm Performance

1.5

CMO
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1

CMO
Presence
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Low Industry Orientation
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High Industry Orientation
(Differentiation)

Figure 5 illustrates the interaction effect of industry orientation (differentiation)
and firm performance when a CMO is present or absent on the TMT. In situations where
industry differentiation is low, the presence of a CMO enhances the relationship between
industry differentiation and firm performance. However, when industry differentiation is
high, they do not.
Finally, because Nath and Mahajan (2008) broadly define CMO presence as any
executive on the TMT with the term “marketing” in his or her title, additional analysis
was conducted to examine each hypothesis using the broader definition of a CMO.3
Findings are reported in Appendix 1. Using the broader definition of a CMO, this study
found that the position still fails to directly affect firm performance (β = –.042, p = .129),

3

In addition to CMO, titles included vice president marketing, senior vice president
marketing, or executive vice president marketing (Nath & Mahajan, 2008).
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consistent with prior research findings (Kashmiri & Mahajan, 2010; Nath & Mahajan,
2008, 2011). Furthermore, using the broader definition of a CMO, none of the hypotheses
were supported or statistically significant.

DISCUSSION
The goal of this study was to add empirical evidence to the emerging scholarly
discussion (Abernathy et al., 2013; Boyd et al., 2010; Moorman & Rust, 1999; Nath &
Mahajan, 2008; Srivastava et al., 1998; Vafeas & Vlittis, 2009; Webster et al., 2003;
Weinzimmer et al., 2003) on the financial impact of having a CMO on the TMT. I
hypothesized that CMO presence contributes to firm performance by signaling the
presence and quality of firm-level resources. The application of signaling theory in this
manner recognized and examined the signaling effect of CMO presence on the TMT on
firm performance (Connelly et al., 2011; Jones & Murrell, 2001; Spence, 1973, 1974).
The use of Tobin’s Q as the measure of performance was based on the notion that it
reflects the value of the firm as perceived by its shareholders (Nath & Mahajan, 2008)
and incorporates information signals (Xue, 2005).
Thus, this study attempted to examine the explanatory power of signaling theory
by theorizing that creating a CMO position acts as a sufficient signal to the marketplace
to moderate firm performance. Specifically, this study examined the moderating
influence of the presence/absence of a CMO on the TMT on three firm-level factors—
firm visibility, firm market power, and firm industry orientation (differentiation)—each
hypothesized to significantly influence firm performance (Andras & Srinivasan, 2003;
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Chung & Jo, 1996; Farris & Buzzell, 1979; Kashmiri & Mahajan, 2010; Kotabe, 1990;
Mansfield, 1981; McGahan & Porter, 1997).
I hypothesized (H1) that CMO presence would moderate the relationship between
firm visibility and firm performance, such that when a CMO is present, the relationship is
stronger, but when a CMO is absent, the relationship is weaker. I further hypothesized
(H2) that CMO presence would moderate the relationship between firm market power
and firm performance, such that when a CMO is present, the relationship is stronger, but
when a CMO is absent, the relationship is weaker. Finally, I hypothesized (H3) that CMO
presence would moderate the relationship between industry orientation and firm
performance, such that in differentiated industries when a CMO is present, the
relationship is stronger, but when a CMO is absent, the relationship is weaker.
I found the presence of a CMO on the TMT overall negatively moderated the
relationship between firm visibility and firm performance; thus, H1 was not supported.
One reason for this finding may be because the social capital of CMO’s are low given the
low incidence of the position on TMTs in several industries. However, while H1 was not
supported, I discovered an interaction that represents an important finding, one that sheds
new light on conditions under which a CMO may favorably influence firm performance
and that can be explained through the lens of signaling theory. As suggested in Chart 1,
having a CMO on the TMT is one way a firm with low firm visibility can moderate firm
performance and, ultimately, firm visibility. By including a CMO on the TMT, a firm
with low visibility could be interpreted by the market as signaling that the firm has
unique resources and is going to undertake initiatives in the future that enhance its firm
performance. Another possible explanation for this effect is that a low visibility firm with
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a CMO on the TMT could attract sufficient attention to compel more market analysts to
take note of and to initiate coverage of that firm. This would in turn lead to increased firm
visibility up to the tipping point at which a firm no longer receives signaling benefits
associated with a CMO on the TMT. Both possible scenarios offer an explanation of this
interaction through the lens of signaling theory.
This study suggested that the presence of a CMO on the TMT would moderate the
relationship between market power and firm performance, but no statistically significant
support for H2 was found. One possible explanation for the lackluster firm performance
in the presence of high market power may be that marketing strategies were not aligned
with overall business strategies (Slater & Olson, 2001). For example, one of the primary
tasks of marketing is relationship management and the formation and management of
strategic alliances (Webster, 1992). Another possible explanation may be that creating
market power is inherently resource intensive and profit dilutive and eventually reaches a
point of diminishing returns.
Finally, this study suggested that the presence of a CMO on the TMT would
moderate the relationship between industry orientation and firm performance; however,
no support for H3 was found. This may be because innate environmental forces within
differentiated industries provide a broader array of competitive actions (Porter, 1980),
offsetting the impact of functional diversity in the TMT, such as having a CMO. Mauri
and Michaels (1998) empirically suggest that industry effects are more important than
firm effects on firm performance in two instances: technology and marketing strategies.
An industry’s life cycle may also alter the influence of CMO presence on the TMT, such
as in the degree of proactiveness adopted by a firm (Lumpkin & Dess, 2001).
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Contributions
The intended contribution of this study was to expand the scope of scholarly
inquiry to include CMO relationships (firm visibility, market power, and industry
orientation) that previous research had not specifically or empirically explored. The
primary contribution of this study is that it provides support for the notion that having
someone with the CMO title on the TMT can moderate firm performance under certain
conditions. One such condition is low firm visibility. In keeping with prior literature, this
study provided additional empirical support that the CMO position, defined narrowly or
broadly, does not directly enhance firm performance (Kashmiri & Mahajan, 2010; Nath
& Mahajan, 2008, 2011). The findings also support the notion that a CMO has signaling
power in certain conditions, sufficient to convey to outsiders that the firm may or may not
possess intangible assets or will undertake potential actions to enhance firm performance,
following the findings of Vafeas and Vlittis (2009).

Managerial Implications
From this examination, five implications for firms arise. First, firms should
recognize that external stakeholders may not always perceive some positions on the
TMT, such as the CMO, as a signal. This may occur because the CMO position is still
relatively new within the C-suite and adoption of the position in TMTs remains low,
especially in some industries. This is not to suggest that the contributions of CMOs are
less important than those of other functional positions; rather, their ability to
communicate positive but otherwise imperceptible firm qualities to outsiders may be
limited to certain conditions.
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Second, this study provides support for the inclusion of a CMO on the TMT under
certain conditions. One such condition occurs when firm visibility is low. Third,
managers should recognize that external stakeholders view the title of CMO differently
than that of other marketing titles (i.e., vice president marketing, senior vice president
marketing, or executive vice president marketing) that may be represented on the TMT.
Specifically, my study suggests that unless the TMT includes someone with the specific
title of CMO, signaling power sufficient to moderate firm level resources on firm
performance may not be achieved. Fourth, managers should recognize that while the
inclusion of a CMO on the TMT may not directly affect or moderate firm performance in
every situation, the position does enhance functional diversity of the TMT (Michel &
Hambrick, 1992; Pegels, Song, &Yang, 2000; Weinzimmer et al., 2003; Wiersema &
Bantel, 1992). The CMO position also serves to elevate marketing issues to the corporate
level (Kerin, 2005; McGovern et al., 2004) and provides a way for the firm to meet the
ongoing demand for firm-level information by capital market actors. Finally, the
increased presence of CMOs in industries like Consumer Discretionary, Consumer
Staples, Financial, Information Technology, and Telecommunications suggest there may
be industry specific benefits other than enhancing firm performance for firms operating in
those industries.

Limitations
The primary limitation of this study was the inability to reject the null hypotheses
in one of the three instances. It should be noted this study had several other minor
limitations. First, given the use of Tobin’s Q as the measure of firm performance, the
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sample is limited to being comprised of only publicly traded firms. As a result, my
sample may be biased because it did not include smaller or younger firms that typically
are not publicly traded. This data set was further limited when publicly traded firms
elected, for competitive or other reasons, not to report advertising or R&D expenditures
during the period examined. The data set was also limited to U.S. firms and observations
taken within a two year period.
Second, most observations from the Energy and Utility industries were not
included in the final data set because one or more of the data points were deemed outliers
from the overall data set and were discarded. Third, this study did not specifically control
for performance variation across firms; rather only firm-level characteristics previously
suggested to influence firm performance were included. Similarly, this study did not
control for variations in CMO power (Nath & Mahajan, 2011), managerial discretion
(Boyd et al., 2010), or alignment of marketing strategies with overall business strategies
(Slater & Olsen, 2001), all previously suggested to influence performance variation
because this study was limited to secondary data. Clearly, more empirical work is needed
to define and understand the nature of the relationship between CMO presence and firm
performance. Overcoming the limitations of this study, particularly controlling for
performance variation, such as CMO power (Nath & Mahajan, 2011), offers future
scholars several areas for further investigation.

Future Research
Within the context of this study, several questions remain. Foremost, why do
some industries such as Consumer Discretionary and Information Technology have high
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concentrations of CMOs on the TMT while others do not? Does the degree of social
capital of a CMO influence their ability to moderate environmental conditions? This
study suggests that future research comparing firms with and without a CMO on the TMT
within these industries would be worthwhile. The outcome of this study also suggested
differences exist between a titled CMO and someone with “marketing” in their title on
the TMT. Understanding these differences could further aid firms in decisions about
TMT structure.
Given the average tenure of the CMO position is just 45 months (Spencer Stuart,
2013); future research should examine the role of duration of CMO tenure, past and
present, as a signal to external stakeholders. Spencer Stuart (2013) reports that CMO
tenure also varies across industries with the shortest tenure in the automotive, restaurant,
and communications/media sectors, averaging between 27 to 31 months, while the
average CMO tenure in technology industries averages 64 months. Thus, a longitudinal
research design could yield important results. Conversely, future research should also
examine the possibility that CMO presence on the TMT may send negative signals to
stakeholders similar to those observed in this study or after CMO appointments (Vafeas
& Vlittis, 2009). Likewise, future research is warranted to gain a better understanding of
the differences, both perceived and functional, between the CMO position and alternative
marketing titles that frequently appear on the TMT. Revisiting prior study designs may
also be warranted using the narrower definition of a CMO.
Further research examining the relationship between CMO presence and firm
performance should examine the relationship through a different theoretical lens such as
contingency theory. A different theoretical perspective may suggest a different
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moderating relationship or measure of firm performance than I examined, shedding much
needed light on why some firms or industries value a CMO on the TMT while others do
not. Examining conditions such as managerial uncertainty or firm legitimacy in the case
of new firms may suggest a more appropriate theory to better illuminate the value of a
CMO on the TMT. Research that finds statistically significant relationships in these areas
will be of value to scholars, firms, and stakeholders alike.

Conclusion
In conclusion, was it reasonable to predict that the presence/absence of a CMO on
the TMT would moderate the relationship between firm visibility, firm market power,
and industry orientation and firm performance? Conflicting prior research on the direct
effect (i.e., Abernathy et al., 2013; Nath & Mahajan, 2008; Weinzimmer et al., 2003)
suggests that further empirical examination was warranted. While no direct effect on firm
performance was observed in this study, empirical support was found for the moderating
influence of CMO presence on the relationship between firm visibility and firm
performance, and industry orientation and firm performance, albeit not as hypothesized.
Perhaps more important, my findings suggest moderating relationships exist between
CMO presence and firm performance that are conditional in nature. For example, the
interaction observed between firm visibility and firm performance when a CMO is
present or when industry orientation (differentiation) is low, provides valuable new
insights into conditions where a CMO may amplify firm level resources and, ultimately,
firm performance.
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Analysis using a broader title definition of CMO (any title that included
“marketing”) similar to Nath and Mahajan (2008; 2011) failed to find a direct effect of
CMO presence on firm performance or reject the null hypotheses proposed in all three
models. Thus, regardless of CMO definition, my findings were consistent with prior
research that suggested no direct relationship between CMO presence on the TMT and
firm performance (Nath & Mahajan, 2008, 2011). Finally, the use of signaling theory
may have been premature because the CMO position, relative to other, more established
positions on the TMT, such as the chief financial officer, is still in its infancy in many
U.S. industries.
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Appendix 1
Moderating Effect of CMO Presence Using Broader Definition on Firm Performance
Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analysis
Variables
Step 1: Constant

Model 1A
B
(SE)
1.097*** (.170)

Model 1B
B
(SE)
1.119*** (.167)

Model 1C
B
(SE)
1.118*** (.167)

Model 1D
B
(SE)
1.119*** (.167)

Model 1E
B
(SE)
1.115*** (.167)

Step 2: Control Variables
Firm Size
Firm Age
TMT Size
Ind - Energy
Ind - Materials
Ind - Industrials
Ind - Consumer Discretionary
Ind - Consumer Staples
Ind - Healthcare
Ind - Financials
Ind - IT
Ind - Telecomm

.000
-.001**
.003
.113
.076
-.059
-.016
.076
.242
-.164
.131
-.118

.000
-.001**
-.017**
.077
.052
-.065
-.002
.145
.222
-.081
.114
-.105

(.000)
(.000)
(.006)
(.189)
(.173)
(.169)
(.169)
(.180)
(.169)
(.189)
(.169)
(.189)

.000
-.001***
-.017**
.078
.055
-.064
-.004
.139
.222
-.090
.111
-.110

(.000)
(.000)
(.006)
(.189)
(.173)
(.169)
(.169)
(.180)
(.169)
(.189)
(.168)
(.189)

.000
-.001***
-.017**
.075
.051
-.065
-.004
.146
.220
-.082
.114
-.104

(.000)
(.000)
(.006)
(.190)
(.173)
(.169)
(.169)
(.181)
(.169)
(.189)
(.169)
(.189)

.000
-.001**
-.018**
.078
.053
-.063
.001
.148
.226
-.075
.117
-.101

(.000)
(.000)
(.006)
(.189)
(.173)
(.169)
(.169)
(.180)
(.169)
(.189)
(.169)
(.189)

.162***
.156**
-.014
-.042

(.023)
(.054)
(.015)
(.028)

.146***
.152**
-.014
-.041*

(.028)
(.054)
(.015)
(.028)

.162***
.173**
-.015
.043

(.023)
(.062)
(.015)
(.035)

.162***
.160**
-.025
.042

(.023)
(.054)
(.021)
(.028)

.040

(.039)
-.066

(.119)
-.019

(.026)

(.000)
(.000)
(.006)
(.194)
(.177)
(.173)
(.171)
(.180)
(.172)
(.189)
(.172)
(.190)

Step 3: Main Effects
Firm Visibility
Market Power
Industry Orientation
CMO / Any Marketing Presence
Step 4: Moderated Variables
CMO / Any Mktg Presence X Firm Visibility
CMO / Any Mktg Presence X Market Power
CMO / Any Mktg Presence X Industry Orientation
Overall Model R²
Adjusted R²
Change in R²

.092***
.081
.092

.139***
.125
.047

n = 1,058
CMO Presence / Any Marketing Title on TMT: 1= Present, 0= Absent.
Dependant variable: Tobin's Q.
Change in R² reported for Model 1C, 1D and 1E over Model 1B.
Unstandardized coefficients and standard error reported.
*=.05,**=.01, ***=.001 One-tailed test.
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.139**
.125
.001

.139
.125
.000

.139
.125
.000

